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1 General Introduction 
Longer life expectancy and low fertility rates increase the share of elderly among 
the population of most industrialized and developing countries. This demographic 
change affects the economy and the society, and is most likely to proceed in the 
future. The global share of elderly (aged 60 years and above) is currently around 12 
per cent and is estimated to double until 2050. Today, particularly industrialized 
countries are already facing the consequences of an aging society; developing 
countries are soon to follow as their older population is already growing at a faster 
rate (United Nations, 2013). Thus, demographic aging is one of the major global 
challenges of the 21st century.  
One particularly great challenge comes with the rising number of fragile 
elderly people, for which many countries are currently unable to provide sufficient 
long-term care solutions. Finding such is difficult, as they need to account for 
economic, social, and ethical considerations - which can highly differ between 
countries. Despite a growing formal care sector, the majority of elderly care is still 
provided within the family (OECD, 2011). Therefore, both policy makers and 
families need to be aware of the implications associated with an aging population. 
In Germany, for instance, public support promotes these informal care 
arrangements (§3 SGB XI) and endorses care receivers to remain in their domestic 
environment. Even though most families prefer such informal care arrangements, 
caregiving can have a large impact on the caregivers’ lives. Policy makers need to 
measure and incorporate these outcomes in order to provide suitable aid for caring 
families and, thereby, ensuring a sustainable and dignified aging of the population.  
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This dissertation consists of three academic papers and contributes to the 
topic in several ways: the first paper reviews the recent literature on the effects of 
informal caregiving on the caregiver and, thereby, assesses the opportunity costs 
associated with informal care provision. A large body of academic literature has 
provided important insights to help understanding the social dynamics associated 
with caregiving. The paper reviews the literature from various fields – i.e., 
economics, gerontology, and psychology – and summaries the heterogeneous 
empirical work on the implications of caregiving on the caregiver’s employment, 
health, and family. Further, the paper analyzes the used methodology and identifies 
certain risk groups, as well as arrangements that are particularly burdensome.  
The second paper is an empirical analysis of data from the German Socio 
Economic Panel (GSOEP) that analyzes the effects of providing care on the 
subjective well-being of caregivers in Germany. The study considers not only the 
intensity of caregiving, but also the care duration. In contrast to most prior studies, 
the paper uses large population-based longitudinal data, accounts for unobserved 
heterogeneity, and estimates the relationship with different methodologies. The 
paper further values well-being losses monetarily, which allows a comparison to 
formal care alternatives.  
The third paper provides new insights on individual selection behavior in 
the German market for supplemental health insurances. This is an increasingly 
popular way to insure against long-term care needs, a risk not fully covered despite 
a statutory long-term care insurance. Private insurance markets are fragile in the 
presence of asymmetric information and, therefore, might not be a sustainable 
solution to cover the increasing risks of an aging society. An innovative approach 
is developed to disentangle different selection behavior in a heterogeneous sample 
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and identify asymmetric information, exemplarily for the market of supplemental 
dental insurance, despite the lack of a significant coverage-risk correlation for the 
aggregated sample. These results yield important information to improve the 
efficiency on the German market for supplemental health insurances and, therefore, 
could be used to increase overall welfare. This thesis ends with a general summary 
of the results and concluding remarks. 
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2 Impacts of Informal Caregiving on Caregiver 








As the aging population increases, the demand for informal caregiving is 
becoming an ever more important concern for researchers and policy-makers 
alike. To shed light on the implications of informal caregiving, this paper 
reviews current research on its impact on three areas of caregivers’ lives: 
employment, health, and family. Because the literature is inherently in-
terdisciplinary, the research designs, sampling procedures, and statistical 
methods used are heterogeneous. Nevertheless, we are still able to draw 
several important conclusions: first, despite the prevalence of informal 
caregiving and its primary association with lower levels of employment, the 
affected labor force is seemingly small. Second, such caregiving tends to 
lower the quality of the caregiver’s psychological health, which also has a 
negative impact on physical health outcomes. Third, the implications for 
family life remain under investigated. The research findings also differ 
strongly among subgroups, although they do suggest that female, spousal, 
and intense caregivers tend to be the most affected by caregiving.  
 
  
                                                                
1  This paper is joint work with Alfonso Sousa-Poza from the University of Hohenheim. The 
candidate’s individual contribution focused mainly on the structure of the paper, the writing, and 
the literature research. The paper is printed with kind permission of Springer. It has been 
originally published as Bauer J. M. & Sousa-Poza A. (2015). Impacts of Informal Caregiving on 
Caregiver Employment, Health, and Family. Journal of Population Ageing. Doi: 
10.1007/s12062-015-9116-0. Therefore, the authors thank the two unknown referees for their 
helpful comments.  
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2.1 Introduction 
Not only have increasing life expectancy and lower fertility rates increased the 
elderly dependency ratio in most industrialized countries (Bettio & Verashchagina, 
2010), but a higher share of elderly, being associated with worse health, inherently 
implies a higher demand for care (Polder et al., 2002; Schwarzkopf et al., 2012). In 
most countries, a major share of such care is provided informally, meaning that it 
is not reflected in social statistics (Bettio & Verashchagina, 2010; Kemper et al., 
2005). Yet even though informal caregivers work mostly without payment, care 
provision can still come at a certain cost: in particular, it is time-consuming, 
mentally stressful, and physically exhausting, which can negatively affect the 
caregiver’s career and health. The main focus of this paper, therefore, is the effect 
of informal care provision in three different domains of the caregiver’s life: 
employment, health, and family. In terms of the first, caregiving is often a full-time 
job, which reduces its compatibility with full-time employment. Hence, we examine 
the impact of caregiving on employment at both the extensive and intensive margin. 
As regards the second, caregiving can be a mentally and physically burdening task 
that negatively affects caregiver health. Because the body of literature on such 
effects is large, however, we review the research on psychological and physical 
health separately. For effects on the family, we concentrate on the literature that 
addresses caregivers’ family dynamics and living arrangements, because caregiving 
is constantly present within the household and therefore affects the family’s daily 
living. 
Although committing to a caregiver role is an individual decision, the welfare 
support needed by elderly for whom no informal care is available is also a matter 
for policy-makers. Yet economic analyses point to a complex problem set; in 
 6 
particular, different countries have selected different solutions, and it remains 
unclear whether it is formal or informal care expansion that would best meet rising 
demand. On the one hand, fostering informal care ties labor to households in which 
productivity may be lower than in the labor market. On the other, not only is the 
expansion of formal care support expensive and unpopular among care recipients, 
but theoretically, it remains unclear whether formal and informal care are actually 
substitutes. Formal care does, however, allow caregivers to better manage their 
domestic care arrangements and may reduce the need for placement in nursing 
homes.  
This review, based on the most relevant literature identified in a web search on 
caregiving effects,2 focuses on the outcomes of elderly caregiving on the caregiver 
from primarily an economic perspective. With a few noteworthy exceptions,3 it 
includes only empirical work published in peer-reviewed journals between 2000 
and 2013. However, because the effects of caregiving on health outcomes are also 
extensively analyzed in gerontology, psychology, and medicine, when assessing the 
health effects of caregiving, we refer to several meta-studies and literature reviews 
from these disciplines.  
The paper is structured as follows: After providing an overview of the 
prevalence and measurement of informal care, as well as the institutional 
background, we focus on the impact of caregiving on the caregiver. From this 
discussion, we draw several conclusions, which are elaborated in the final section.  
                                                                
2  The literature was identified by using the following key works and their combinations in Google 
Scholar, Scopus, and Science Direct: “elderly care,” “informal care,” “aged care,” 
“employment,” “labor force participation,” “work,” “work hours,” “wage,” “health,” “burden,” 
“well-being,” “family,” and “relationship.” We also screened the references for any important 
omissions. 
3  Because the research on implications for the family was sparse, we extended the time span for 
this topic to a few literature reviews published prior to 2000.  
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2.2 Background 
Despite widespread agreement that family members are the backbone of a society’s 
care supply4, exact numbers on informal caregiving are unavailable because two 
vital elements for gauging them are lacking, an official definition of informal care
 
and official statistics on household production. Nevertheless, a report funded by the 
European Commission (Triantafillou et al., 2010) does identify the following 
characteristics as typical of informal caregivers (see also Van den Berg et al., 2004; 
OECD, 2011): a close relationship with the care receiver, no professional training, 
no working contract, no equivalent pay, a wide range of care giving duties, no 
official hours (never really off duty), and no entitlement to social rights.  
Prevalence of Informal Care 
Policy-makers need to know the prevalence and value of informal work because 
changes in informal supply are linked to public welfare and influence the social 
security balance sheet. Although officials in countries that publicly support 
informal care (e.g., Germany) can gather data about care recipients from their long-
term care insurance (LTCI)5 provider, these data focus on care recipients (not 
caregivers) and exclude those who do not apply for benefits or fit none of the 
entitlement requirements. As a result, most information on the magnitude of 
informal care6 is derived from surveys,7 often in the form of interviews with 
representative subsamples. In 2011, the OECD released a report on long-term care 
                                                                
4  See Albertini et al. (2007) for a theoretical and empirical discussion of European family transfers. 
5  In 2011, 2.5 million people received benefits from the German LTCI, which equals about 3.1% 
of the population. 
6  Such research commonly employs one of two survey methods: (i) diary methods, considered the 
gold standard because they bring in the most accurate information about time use, and (ii) recall 
methods, which are more widely used because they are easier and cheaper to carry out (Van den 
Berg et al., 2004). 
7  For example, the 2001 UK census reported 5.2 million informal caregivers in England and 
Wales, while the 2000 General Household Survey identified 6.8 million for the entire UK 
(Heitmueller, 2007).  
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that examined the challenges for countries facing growth in care needs. With an 
almost 10% share of people over 80 by 2050, demand is estimated to be largest in 
OECD countries. However, the care regimes differ substantially between nations: 
for example, while only 8% of the population in Sweden reports being involved in 
informal caregiving (providing help with activities of daily living); the share in Italy 
is reportedly twice as high.  
In a report for the European Commission, Bettio and Verashchagina (2010) use 
the Survey on Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) to document the 
extent of informal care in the European Union. They report that in 2007, 
approximately 60% of the 20.7 million dependent elderly in the EU received 
informal or no care, thereby highlighting that “informal care givers—family and 
friends—remain the most important group of providers [in the EU]” (p. 77). 
Moreover, differences in the prevalence of informal care across Europe are large, 
with certain Eastern European countries relying nearly exclusively on informal care 
while countries like France and Belgium have a much larger share of formal care. 
For the United States, precise diary information from the American Time Use 
Survey suggests that in 2011–2012, 39.6 million people in the civilian 
(noninstitutional) U.S. population aged 15 and over engaged in elderly care 
provision (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2013).  
Institutional Differences 
The variation in informal care among countries can be accounted for, at least to 
some extent, by differences in the availability of public support and possible 
alternatives, which determine the opportunity costs of becoming a caregiver. In 
most OECD countries, caregivers are entitled to leave work for a limited amount of 
time, but the absence granted from work varies and only some countries provide 
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paid leave. Even when paid leave is provided, however, it tends to be short, usually 
less than a month and rarely as long as the 12 months allowed in Belgium. The 
amount of such compensation also varies; Scandinavian countries, for example, 
offer between 40% and 100% of the caregiver’s original wage. With regard to 
regulation of unpaid leave, countries can be grouped into two clusters (OECD, 
2011): countries in one cluster, including Belgium, France, Spain, and Ireland, 
allow absence from work for several years; those in the other (which includes 
mostly English-speaking countries) only grants shorter leaves of up to three months. 
Yet even though such regulations exist, data from the 2004 European Establishment 
Survey on Working Time and Work-Life Balance shows that the use of these 
opportunities is still limited (OECD, 2011). That is, although care leave is available 
to roughly one third of employees in Europe, with lower shares for Canada and 
Japan, its use differs among sectors, being more common in the public sector and 
in large companies. 
Another incentive used to promote care in the home to avoid hospitalization is 
financial transfers made either to the care receivers themselves or to the informal 
caregivers. Entitlement to such benefits, however, also differs across countries: in 
Scandinavia, for instance, caregivers receive a remuneration that can vary with care 
needs. However, even though the compensation in Sweden, for example, is fairly 
generous, the regulations for granting such compensation are very restrictive to 
minimize disincentives to work among certain low-wage earners. These 
disincentives are even greater for caregivers living in English-speaking countries 
where benefits are means tested. If the entitlement to benefits requires that 
caregivers earn below a certain threshold, it reduces the opportunity costs for 
dropping out of the labor force or reducing working hours. Providing cash benefits 
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directly to the care receiver, on the other hand, avoids many administrative issues 
because the care receivers decide how the money will be used. Such direct 
payments, which allow care receivers a very flexible use of money to meet their 
individual needs, are used by three quarters of OECD countries. However, this 
payment scheme, although intended to promote individual responsibility, carries 
other risks to family arrangements. For example, introducing such financial 
incentives into an altruistically motivated care relationship could promote monetary 
dependency by caregivers and thus decrease intrinsic motivation.  
In Germany, instead of cash transfers, families can also receive benefits in kind. 
For instance, depending on the intensity of the care needs, families can get support 
from private formal care professionals who perform certain care tasks in the 
domestic environment. Such care support is often used when the care burden 
exceeds the informal caregiver’s capability. When care needs become so intense 
that the household is unable to ensure appropriate accommodations, 
institutionalization may become unavoidable. In this case, some countries provide 
financial support by paying a certain share of the monthly expenses for the nursing 
home.  
In general, however, public support—whether in cash or kind—affects families’ 
willingness to provide informal care, a link than can move in either of two 
directions. On the one hand, formal care can complement informal care, especially 
when the informal caregiver is employed, while cash benefits allow the caregiver 
to reduce employment to provide sufficient care and keep income at an acceptable 
level. Formal support may also reduce the care burden to a compatible level, thereby 
enabling the employee to maintain the informal care arrangement. On the other 
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hand, when formal care substitutes for informal care, an increase in its supply 
decreases the time devoted to informal care. 
Several empirical studies find evidence for such substitution effects (Clark et 
al., 2001; Van Houtven & Norton, 2004; Bolin et al., 2008a; Pickard 2012), which, 
even though mostly small, are characterized by a clear negative correlation between 
informal and form care alternatives in both the U.S. and Europe. Bonsang (2009), 
for example, finds a negative correlation between hours of low-skilled formal care 
(e.g., housework, shopping, and minor care tasks) and informal care, while high-
skill tasks (e.g., nursing care) for severely impaired elderly parents complement 
informal care weakly. These results, which seem consistent among the nine 
European countries studied,8 suggest that in severe care situations, a combination 
of informal and formal domestic care can avoid the need for nursing home 
placement.  
Value of Informal Care 
Because informal care is, by its very nature, not handled by the market, it has no 
price tag, making a proper comparison with formal care only possible to a certain 
extent. Nonetheless, several studies have tried to measure and valuate informal care 
monetarily using various methods to estimate an adequate price for care hours.9 For 
the U.S., for example, Arno et al. (1999) investigate the prevalence of informal care 
and the amount of money needed to substitute all informal care with formal 
                                                                
8  Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden. 
9  The three commonest methods for valuing the amount of informal care are (i) using the 
caregiver’s opportunity to value the time that could be used to supply labor elsewhere, (ii) 
valuing the time provided according to possible market substitutes (e.g., nurses or unskilled 
workers), and (iii) using the caregivers’ reported well-being and valuing the mean time spent on 
caregiving based on the rise in income necessary to keep caregiver well-being constant when 
providing one additional hour of care (Van den Berg & Ferrer-i Carbonell, 2007). The second 
method, often termed the “proxy good method,” is the most widely used because of its ease of 
application (for further information, see Van den Berg et al., 2004, 2005, Van den Berg & 
Spauwen, 2006, Sousa-Poza et al., 2001). 
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alternatives. For their approximation, they use two data sets from the mid-1980s 
and assume constant caregiving ratios for the same cohorts until 1997. The hours 
of caring are taken from the National Family Caregiving Survey, which suggests an 
average of 17.9 hours per week. Setting the valuing wage at $8.18, the mean of the 
minimum and average wages of home health aides, they calculate the value of 
informal caregiving as $198 billion, which is equivalent to 18% of total U.S. health 
care expenditures at that time. A similar study on dementia caregiving, however, 
calculates a 1993 value of only $18 billion (Langa et al., 2001).  
In a 2006 measure of the magnitude of informal care in Germany, Schneider 
(2006) estimates that 7% (4.8 million) of the over-16 German population are care 
providers, which corresponds to 4.9 billion hours of informal care. Substituting for 
this informal labor would require over 3 million full-time employees and, 
depending on wages, between €30 and €60 billion in salary. For Dutch caregivers, 
Van den Berg and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2007) estimate the monetary compensation 
for one additional hour that would keep caregiver well-being constant. Based on the 
means of caring hours (49 hours per week) and income (€1,665 net household 
income per month), they identify adequate compensation as between €7 and €10 
for each additional hour of care,10 which is slightly lower than most Dutch market 
proxies. 
2.3 Implications for Caregivers 
Even though many care arrangements involve informal support, care provision is 
often a burden, so households must find an arrangement that takes into account 
several factors. First, care recipients usually prefer to stay in their own homes, 
                                                                
10  Price varies based on the family relationship between care recipient and caregiver, with family 
caregiving requiring higher monetary compensation. 
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which requires either family members able and willing to provide informal care or 
formal care support that is both accessible and affordable. In deciding between the 
two, potential caregivers must be aware that caregiving is a major responsibility 
that is time consuming and stressful. In addition, because the need for care occurs 
primarily at an older age, spouses are likely to be older themselves, which reduces 
their capabilities. Children, on the other hand, being more likely to be employed or 
have other obligations within their own household, face higher opportunity costs. 
Hence, choosing either arrangement always involves trade-offs for the caregiver. 
In the following sections, we review the relevant literature with a focus on the 
implications for caregiver employment, health, and family, not only in terms of 
individual outcomes but also from a policy perspective. Undoubtedly, if dignified 
aging is to be ensured, the increased demand for caregiving must be met with a 
satisfactory supply, yet formal care is expensive and public money short. Fostering 
informal care arrangements, therefore, seems tempting because it saves direct costs 
in professional care services and can postpone expensive hospitalization. These 
savings, however, may be offset by such indirect costs as reduced employment, 
possible loss in human capital, and higher health care expenditures for caregivers. 
2.3.1 Employment  
When potential caregivers are of working age, the time used for informal care 
competes with that for paid work, meaning that the opportunity costs of informal 
care are often associated with paid employment11 (Becker, 1965). We therefore 
examine the evidence of a link between informal care and employment decisions 
and strive to identify which characteristics of the care arrangement matter and to 
                                                                
11  For extensions with other time-allocation categories, see Gronan (1977); for a summary of all 
costs for adult caregivers, see Keating et al. (2014). 
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what extent informal care affects caregiver employment. In particular, caregiving 
is still too often seen as “women’s work,” meaning that recent political efforts to 
increase female labor force participation (e.g., European Commission, 2011) are 
likely to fail for women tied to a caregiver role. Conversely, there are rising 
concerns that increasing female labor force participation could reduce the willing 
supply of informal care. If a smaller supply of informal care does indeed imply a 
greater demand for formal care, then understanding the link between care and work 
is extremely important for forecasting future care needs. 
Research into these issues has been greatly facilitated by the growing 
availability of longitudinal data and the development of more sophisticated 
statistical methods. In particular, these latter are greatly aiding the determination of 
causality, which although not taken into account by all the studies reviewed here 
(see table 2.1), is always an important consideration. From the causal perspective, 
any negative care-work association can be explained in two ways: first, care is time 
consuming, so combining it with regular employment is difficult; caregivers must 
reduce work hours or even quit their jobs to provide sufficient care to the individual 
in need. Second, because unemployed or part-time workers have more time, they 
are more likely to become caregivers. Not only are these two lines of causality 
equally plausible, they are not mutually exclusive and can even occur 
simultaneously (Michaud et al., 2010). However, several recent studies find little 
evidence for an endogenous caregiving decision and thus treat caregiving as 
exogenous, particularly when controlling for unobserved individual characteristics 
in panel data (see Bolin et al., 2008b; Ciani, 2012; Meng, 2012; Van Houtven et al., 
2013; Nguyen & Connelly, 2014). The instruments used in such research, however, 
often measure the health of potential care receivers, which should exogenously 
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increase the demand for caregiving. These instruments are criticized on the grounds 
that a dummy variable or metric measurement of care hours is unable to sufficiently 
capture a heterogeneous care task. Hassink and Van den Berg (2011), for instance, 
argue that ignoring the fact that some care task are “time-bounded” while others 
can be shifted from one day to another can affect the exclusion restriction in the 
instrumented regressions and thus provide biased estimates. Doubts about the use 
of care needs as an instrument have already been raised by Heitmueller (2007). For 
his cross-sectional data, the IV estimates are almost 10 times larger than the OLS 
results, which are supposed to overestimate the effect of caregiving.  
Work Status 
Although a negative association between informal care and work is supported by 
the theory of opportunity costs and time allocation within households (see Becker, 
1965, Pezzin et al., 1996), several studies refute the existence of such a link, 
reporting only a small or no correlation between the two. For example, Lilly et al.’s 
(2007) review of 34 articles on caregiving’s effects on labor force participation 
published between 1986 and 2006 finds no convincing evidence that caregivers 
show generally lower levels of employment. One explanation for such a weak 
informal care-work relation is caregivers’ low attachment to the labor force, which 
implies that they would be unlikely to increase their participation in paid 
employment even without the caregiving burden. Evidence for such selection is 
provided by several studies: Dautzenberg et al. (2000), for example, although they 
use an admittedly small sample, find that unemployed daughters who live close by 
are most likely to become caregivers. Carmichael et al. (2010) provide evidence 
that future caregivers,12 although they share similarities with actual caregivers, 
                                                                
12  Individuals in year t-1 before they become actual caregivers. 
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differ significantly from those who have never taken on that role. For example, male 
(female) future caregivers have a 6% (5%) lower employment rate and are more 
likely to work in unskilled (noncareer track) occupations. In support of this notion, 
Michaud et al. (2010), using data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), 
show that current employment reduces the probability of becoming a caregiver in 
the future. Results from Dutch data also suggest that employment in the previous 
year reduces the probability of caregiving by 2.4% (Moscarola, 2010). Berecki-
Gisolf et al. (2008), however, can find no systematic difference between Australian 
female future caregivers in their 50s and their noncaregiver peers nor any 
significant effect of current employment on the likelihood of providing care.  
 Nevertheless, as Leigh (2010) emphasizes, selection may take place on 
unobserved characteristics, including personality traits and general labor force 
attachment, and can change the estimates greatly. Using panel data from Australia, 
he finds that accounting for individual fixed-effects reduces the strong negative 
coefficients for the link between caregiving and labor force participation from -20 
to -28% to 4–6% (also see Heitmueller, 2007). Likewise, accounting for individual 
fixed-effects and ruling out endogeneity in a sample from the U.S. Health and 
Retirement Survey (HRS) results in no significant effect of being a caregiver on 
employment probability (Van Houtven et al., 2013). For Germany, Meng (2012), 
in an analysis of the effect of care hours in seven waves of the GSOEP, finds no 
reduction in labor force participation. However, although Viitanen’s (2010) 
analysis of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) initially identifies 
Germany as the only one among 13 European countries that has a significant 
caregiving-work relation, once the state dependency of labor force participation and 
individual fixed-effects are controlled for, this negative impact falls to only 0.3 
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percentage points. For Canada, Lilly et al. (2010) obtain only small, slightly 
significant effects for their male sample and conclude that the net effect of 
caregiving on employment is not significant. 
Even though these effects remain small, however, the majority of studies do 
provide some evidence that caregivers are less likely to have a paid job (Carmichael 
& Charles, 2003; Bittman et al., 2007; Berecki-Gisolf et al., 2008; Bolin et al., 
2008b; Carmichael et al., 2010; Lilly et al., 2010; Nguyen & Connelly, 2014). For 
example, Bolin et al. (2008b), using data from SHARE, identify a 10% increase in 
care hours associated with a 3.7% lower employment probability. In terms of 
comparability, the marginal effect from a random-effects probit in Kotsadam’s 
(2011) analysis of ECHP data indicates that lower employment probability for 
caregivers varies between countries, with a 5% lower probability for the full 
European sample. An analysis of the same data, using a sample of men aged 40–64 
and women aged 40–59, shows a significant but small effect on labor force 
participation, with a causal effect of 1% (2%) for northern (southern) countries in 
Europe (Ciani, 2012). However, a simultaneously estimated care-work equation for 
a Dutch subsample of the ECHP finds the caregiving probability to be 5.8% lower 
once the state dependency of employment is accounted for (Moscarola, 2010).  
Spiess and Schneider (2003), on identifying an asymmetric response in which 
entering the caregiver role reduces labor force participation but leaving or reducing 
it results in no participation adjustment, attribute it to the fact that for the 45- to 59-
year-old women sampled, the years to retirement are few. Wakabayashi and Donato 
(2005) identify a similar dynamic in their female sample—significantly reduced 
labor force participation on entering the caregiver role but no reentry after leaving 
it. This finding is supported by Van Houvten et al. (2013), who demonstrate a 
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significantly higher probability of being retired among caregiving women, while 
employment probabilities remain unaffected. Such an asymmetric response might 
be associated with depreciation of skills: in interviews, caregivers have reported 
being unable to reenter employment after a long duration of caring because their 
job specific knowledge was outdated (Carmichael et al., 2008). 
Work Hours 
The research results on the extensive margin remain rather small, possibly because 
of a flexible working environment that allows caregivers to adjust their work hours 
rather than leaving the labor force completely. There is strong evidence, however, 
that caregivers are more likely to work fewer hours than noncaregivers (Lilly et al., 
2007), a finding supported by multiple recent findings of caregivers adjusting their 
work hours (e.g., Bittman et al., 2007; Berecki-Gisolf et al., 2008; Bolin et al., 
2008b; Leigh, 2010; Kotsadam, 2011; Meng, 2012; Van Houtven et al., 2013). In 
Europe, for instance, Bolin et al. (2008b) find a working-caring-time elasticity for 
a SHARE sample of -0.26 when informal care is treated as exogenous. This rather 
inelastic response on working hours is echoed by Kotsadam (2011), who finds that 
caregivers have 2–3% lower working hours for a full European sample compared 
to noncaregivers. Meng (2012), however, identifies only a small effect for 
Germany: providing 10 hours more care per week is associated with a reduction of 
48 (35) minutes for men (women) in weekly working time. Leigh (2010) obtains 
mixed results depending on the definition of caregiver. For instance, the effect of 
caregiving on work time is significant in a group of individuals that self-classify as 
caregivers but not in a group defined by whether or not they receive public care 
allowances. Similarly, in their analysis for Canada, Lilly et al. (2010) find that once 
they adjust for potential indirect effects from wage differences, primary caregiving 
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has no negative effect on the log of weekly labor force hours, but when they increase 
the threshold of care duty to 15–20 hours per week, a negative link emerges. 
Few recent studies find an overall strong link on working hours, but should be 
treated with caution. For instance, Bittman et al. (2007) observe that about 20% of 
full-time working women in Australia will give up full-time for part-time work after 
taking on care duties. However, this result is based upon simple correlation, which 
might overestimate the casual effect of care on employment. 
That accounting for endogeneity not necessarily reduces the estimates was 
demonstrated by Van Houtven et al. (2013), who also obtain insignificant results 
for caregiving’s effects on work hours when treating informal care as exogenous. 
In their 2SLS approach, only the work hour regressions pass the endogeneity test. 
However, in contrast to the exogenous fixed-effects results, the instrumented care 
supply yields significant and substantial negative effects on work hours: caregivers 
who provided at least 100 hours of care over the previous two years work three 
hours less a week than noncaregivers. Likewise, providing care reduces the working 
hours of middle aged women by 41% on average, even when individual 
heterogeneity and endogeneity is accounted for (Johnson & Lo Sasso, 2006). In line 
with Heitmueller (2007), the results suggest that exogenous caregiving 
underestimates the effect of caregiving on labor force participation. A finding 
difficult to explain, particularly in models accounting for individual fixed-effects. 
Wages 
The opportunity costs of caregiving not only relate to time spent in paid 
employment but may also affect wages. For example, potential caregivers earning 
higher wages face higher opportunity costs for one hour of informal care. In such a 
case, purchasing formal care substitutes is more attractive, implying a negative 
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correlation between time spent for informal care and wages. Caregiving might also 
interfere with work, leading to lower performance and fewer promotions and thus 
a wage penalty for caregivers. Empirical evidence on such wage effects also tends 
to be inconclusive, with some studies finding that caregivers earn lower wages (e.g., 
Carmichael & Charles, 2003; Wakabayashi & Donato, 2005; Bittman et al., 2007; 
Heitmueller & Inglis, 2007) but others identifying no or only very small effects 
(e.g., Bolin et al., 2008b; Lilly et al., 2010; Van Houtven et al., 2013). Carmichael 
and Charles (2003), for example, estimate that wages are 18% (9%) lower for male 
(female) caregivers who provide more than 10 hours of care per week. Likewise, 
Heitmueller and Inglis (2007), using English data to estimate the opportunity costs 
of caregiving in the form of wage reductions, find that caregivers earn about 6% 
less, with about half the reduction directly accounted for by care provision. The 
authors also show that this effect has increased over the years (1993–2002) and 
differs between genders, with women being more affected than men. Bittman et al. 
(2007) relate such wage effects not only to care intensity but also to care duration: 
whereas the income of Australian caregivers in their first two years is lower by 
about $10,000 annually, the difference to noncaregiver increases to $12,000 in the 
fourth year.  
Because caregivers might expect future care demand to increase, Van Houtven 
et al. (2013) speculate that wage reductions might arise from caregivers selecting 
into jobs for which they are overqualified. However, these authors identify no 
overall negative effect on wages and only a small but significant wage reduction 
(3.1%) for women providing help with chores, the least intense care arrangement 
in their analysis. Similarly, using data from SHARE, Bolin et al. (2008b) find that 
caregiving does not generally reduce wages, a result supported by Lilly et al. (2010) 
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for Canada.   
Overall, the empirical findings related to employment and wages, being 
sensitive to the specific care situations and caregiver subgroups, are often difficult 
to generalize. Most studies, for instance, take a distinct look at the caregiver’s 
gender, relationship to the care recipient, and living arrangements. Large impacts 
on the caregivers’ labor force participation are mostly observed among particular 
at-risk groups or subsamples (see, e.g., Nguyen & Connelly, 2014). Researchers 
also often address other characteristics that seem to influence the work-care 
relationship,13 such as the tendency for older, white, or uneducated caregivers to 
suffer more in terms of career (Wakabayashi & Donato, 2005). 
Gender Differences 
The effect of caregiving on employment, work time, and wages often differs 
between men and women. For instance, Carmichael and Charles (2003) show that 
even though all caregivers face lower wages (cf. Heitmueller & Inglis, 2007), which 
reduces the likelihood of their working in a paid job (indirect effect), only women 
directly substitute their paid work with informal care work. The authors further 
report that women seem to have a weaker attachment to employment than their male 
counterparts.14 In support of this latter, King and Pickard (2013) find that only 
women are affected by becoming a caregiver: employed women who begin to 
provide less than 10 hours of care per week have an even higher likelihood than 
noncaregivers of being employed one year later. On the other hand, they also 
observe a negative association between becoming an intense caregiver (over 10 
                                                                
13  For a list of other possible mediators suggested in pre-2006 studies, see Lilly et al. (2007). 
14  Carmichael and Charles (2003) note that they themselves define the direction of causality in this 
paper arbitrarily. In particular, they assume that care choices are made exogenously and do not 
consider opportunity costs, although they do not rule out the possible interaction between the 
mutual effects of care and employment. 
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hours per week) and future employment. The gender-based findings reported by 
Van Houtven et al. (2013), however, contradict these findings. In their examination 
of extensive effects, they show that only men providing personal care are 2.4% less 
likely to work, whereas women suffer a wage penalty and reduced working hours. 
Nguyen and Connelly (2014), in contrast, find no gender differences, whereas 
Meng (2012) identifies a slightly lower reduction in work hours for female 
caregivers in Germany.  
Because women are more frequent caregivers, provide care at higher intensity, 
and experience higher social pressure to provide care (Carmichael & Charles, 
2003), they are of particular research interest, leading some studies to focus only 
on female care provision (e.g., Johnson & Lo Sasso, 2006; Kotsadam, 2011; 
Casado-Marin et al., 2011). For instance Berecki-Gisolf et al. (2008), who find that 
middle-aged females are twice as likely as noncaregivers to reduce their labor force 
participation after becoming caregivers.  
Importance of Residency and Intensity 
In addition to certain caregiver characteristics, the way that caregiving is defined 
also appears crucial. Even though the overall effect of caregiving on employment 
seems to be small, most studies find a relevant association between caregiving and 
labor force participation/wages for at least some types of care arrangement. One 
important characteristic related to employment decisions within caring families is 
residency, which Heitmueller (2007) investigates by using cross-sectional and 
panel data. The different estimations indicate that both co-residential and intensive 
care have a significant impact on employment but extra-residential care does not. 
These findings are confirmed by Casado-Marin et al. (2011) using eight waves of a 
Spanish subsample from the ECHP to show that among middle-aged women, only 
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co-residing caregivers suffer negative effects on labor force participation. Similarly, 
Michaud et al. (2010), in an analysis that accounts for both time-invariant 
heterogeneity and a dynamic care- employment for which causality is plausible in 
both directions, reveal a statistically significant correlation between a co-residential 
caregiver subsample and future occupation, even though they identify no overall 
effect.  
Caregiver residency also plays a crucial role in selection into caregiving. For 
example, Carmichael et al. (2010) use a discrete-time logit model to show a 
negative link between employment, as well as higher hourly earnings, and the 
probability of care provision, especially in a co-residential setting. Such marked 
effects on the caregiver’s labor force participation are not surprising given that co-
residing with the care receiver often reflects high care demands (see Heitmueller, 
2007; Nguyen & Connelly, 2014). Hence, Lilly et al. (2007) conclude that cases of 
intense care are inherently related to lower labor force participation; the threshold 
for intense caregiving varies among studies, but points mostly to caregiving over 
10 hours (King & Pickard, 2013) or 20 hours a week (Heitmueller, 2007; Lilly et 
al., 2010). In fact, Carmichael et al. (2008), in their analysis of the impact of caring 
responsibilities on employment, conclude that those who provide care for long 
hours over a longer period are far more likely to adjust their job participation or 
leave employment completely.  
Additional differences are observable for primary and secondary caregivers, 
with only the former showing meaningful reductions in their labor force 
participation. For instance, Nguyen and Connelly (2014) find an approximately 
12% lower probability for employment among Australian primary caregivers (see 
also, Lilly et al., 2010), a much stronger impact than for secondary caregivers. On 
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the other hand, Lee and Tang (2013), using HRS data to assess differences in types 
of caregiving tasks, find that the employment probability for women providing care 
personal care to their parents is significantly lower, whereas the coefficient for also 
running errands and helping with chores (in combination with personal care) shows 
no effect. This finding stands contrast to Van Houtven et al.’s (2013) observation 
that caring for chores does reduce female wages and increases the retirement 
probability, while personal care has no effect. 
Quality of Work 
Another factor that may be negatively affected by caregiving is work quality, and 
not necessarily just employment status and work hours. Reid et al. (2010), for 
example, show that 46.3% of employed caregivers feel that their work performance 
is affected and about 40% of caregivers say they miss work or have had to leave 
suddenly because of their care responsibilities. These effects could lead to fewer 
promotions and may partly explain why caregivers tend to earn less. For instance, 
a survey among Norwegian caregivers (Gautun & Hagen, 2010) suggests that 
caregiving often leads to late arrival or early departure from work (16%), the need 
to reschedule the work day (13%), and/or problems concentrating during work 
hours (10%). On the other hand, in terms of labor force participation, the survey 
also indicates that most caregivers try to combine work and care by using 
accumulated holidays (31%) and flexible working hours (15%), with only a few 
reducing their work hours. Nevertheless, although the above findings suggest a very 
complex interplay between caregiver, recipient, employer, and the institutional 
background, more recent quantitative research suggests that caregiving’s impact 
leads to a broad spectrum of outcomes in the labor market. Ugreninov (2013), for 
instance, using Norwegian data, demonstrates that employees who combine full-
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time work with caregiving are more likely to be absent from work because of 
sickness. 
International Differences  
Finally, it must be stressed that countries differ in the assistance they provide. For 
example, whereas many countries provide considerable support for those needing 
care and their families, in the United States, such aid tends to be limited. The effects 
of caregiving on labor force participation even differ noticeably within continental 
Europe. For instance, although Bolin et al. (2008b) find no significant effect on 
employment for their entire European sample, they identify a lower probability of 
employment for men from central Europe.15  
Central European caregivers of both genders also work fewer hours than those 
in other areas. The estimates for Nordic caregivers, in contrast, are only significant 
for men. The highest wage gap among the regions is observed between female 
caregivers in southern Europe and their male counterparts.  
These variations may stem from cultural and institutional differences, including 
differing degrees of governmental support for caregivers in the form of such 
entitlements as job leave and tax cuts or benefits like cash and in kind. Families 
formulate their care arrangements in light of such regulations, which must therefore 
be considered when assessing effects on labor force participation or health. For 
example, the negative link found by Spiess and Schneider (2003) between starting 
care provision and working hours in a European sample is only significant for 
northern countries, whereas increasing care hours reduces working hours only in 
the south. 
                                                                
15  The authors divide Europe into the following three areas: (1) Nordic (Sweden and Denmark); 
(2) Central (Germany, France, Netherlands, Austria, and Switzerland), and (3) Southern (Spain, 





Table 2.1: Studies on Informal Care and Employment 
Author  Data  Controls  Key results 
Literature review or meta study 
Lilly et al. (2007) Review of 34 articles (1986–2006) – Carers generally do not show lower levels of 
employment, but intense caregiving is related 
to lower working hours and lower levels of 
labor force participation  
Studies accounting for or ruling out endogeneity and/or account for unobserved heterogeneity 
Berecki-Gisolf et al. (2008)  N=9,837, Australian Longitudinal Study on 
Women’s Health (2001 & 2004, L)  
Selection in care, health of care receiver, 
caregiver demographics  
Employment does not affect selection into 
caregiver role, but providing care is related 
to odds ratios up to 2.11 for reducing work 
hours or leaving employment 
Bolin et al. (2008b) N=3,769. Survey of Health, Ageing and 
Retirement in Europe (2004, C) 
OLS, 2SLS, regional differences, caregiver 
demographics  
Exogeneity of caregiving could not be 
rejected. Evidence for reduced employment 
probability, and working hours. Results vary 
between north and south Europe  
Carmichael et al. (2010)  N=20,000, British Household Panel Survey 
(1991–2005,L)  
Previous care provision, caregiver demo-
graphics, co-residential care 
Occupation and earnings negatively affect 
the probability of demanding care provision 
Casado-Marin et al. (2011) Spanish female subsample of the European 
Community Household Panel (1994-2001, L) 
between 30-60. N= 28,260. 
Ordered probit, IPW estimator against 
attrition, caregiver characteristics 
Lower probabilities for employment were 
observed for women caring for someone at 
home and for those who care for more than 
one period  






Author  Data  Controls  Key results 
Ciani (2012) European Community Household Panel 
(1994-2001, L) with women between 40-59 
and men 40-64 with about 300,000 
observations 
Endogeneity and individual effects, 
caregiver, and care receiver characteristics 
Once individual fixed-effects are accounted 
for, the exogeneity assumption for informal 
care could not be rejected. Effects are small 
and differ between north and south Europe 
Heitmueller (2007)  N=25,000, British Household Panel Survey 
(1991-2003, C & L)  
Endogeneity, co- and extra-resident care, 
intensity, caregiver demographics  
Endogeneity is important if the impact of 
care on employment decisions is not to be 
overestimated. Negative linkage is observed 
for co-residential and intensive care only 
Heitmueller & Inglis (2007) British Household Panel Survey (1993 & 
2002), about 5,000 observations  
Heckman procedure for selection, caregivers 
characteristics 
Employed carers are expected to earn about 
6% less than non-carers. The wage penalty is 
estimated to be 1.04 pounds/hour 
Johnson & Lo Sasso (2006) Household and Retirement Survey (1996-
1998, L) about 2,500 women between 55-67 
Instrumental variables, family and caregiver 
characteristics 
Caregiving substantially reduces working 
hours; not accounting for individual 
heterogeneity might underestimate the effect 
King & Pickard (2013) N=17,123. English Longitudinal Study of 
Ageing (2002-2009, L) aged 50-64.  
Logit, caregiver characteristics Those providing more than 10 hours of care 
show lower levels of employment 
Kotsadam (2011) N=14,478, European Community Household 
Panel (1994–2001, L), females from 14 
countries.  
Random-/fixed-effects logit, probit, caregiver 
characteristics 
Effects on working hours and employment 
probability vary within Europe and are larger 
in southern countries 
Leigh (2010)  7 waves of the Household, Income and 
Labour Dynamics in Australia survey (2001–
2007, L) with 8,000 to 10,000 observations  
Pooled OLS and fixed-effects model  After accounting for individual 
characteristics, only small effects emerged 
for care and employment, while subjective 
well-being remained unaffected 








Author  Data  Controls  Key results 
Meng (2012) N=14,873, German Socio-Economic Panel 
(2001-2007) 
Endogeneity, fixed-effects, caregiver and 
care receiver characteristics  
Labor force participation is not significantly 
reduced. Providing 10 hours more of care a 
week reduces working hours by less than 50 
minutes  
Michaud et al. (2010)  Females age 25 to 59 from the British 
Household Panel Study (2000 -2005, L) 
N=2,551  
Co- and extra-resident care, endogeneity of 
care provision, partner, and partner’s family, 
caregiver demographics 
Small but significant effect of co-residential 
caregiving on future employment  
Moscarola (2010) N=9,656, Dutch women 25-55 from the 
European Community Household Panel 
Surveys (1995-2001, L) 
Dynamic bivariate probit for simultaneous 
estimation with lagged care and work 
variables, caregiver characteristics 
Employees are less likely (5.8%) to become 
caregivers and vice versa (2.4%). 
Nguyen & Connelly (2014) 8 waves of the  Household, Income and 
Labour Dynamics in Australia survey (2001-
2008) with 7,845 observations between 25-
64 
Instrumental variable, multinomial logit, 
endogeneity, co- and extra-resident care, care 
intensity, caregiver demographics 
Endogeneity of the caregiving decision was 
rejected and therefore the estimates were 
treated exogenous. Results suggest that 
caregiving reduces labor force participation 
by around 12% for men and women 
Van Houtven et al. (2013) Health and Retirement Study (1992-2008, L) 
with around 4,000 men and women.  
Instrumental variable, fixed-effects, care 
tasks, caregiver characteristics.  
Endogeneity was only found for the work 
hours equations and drastically increased the 
negative association. Exogenous estimates 
for employment probability and wages 
remained mostly not significant. Women 
were more likely to retire 
Viitanen (2010) European Community Household Panel 
(1994-2001, L) around 900,000 observations 
from 13 countries. 
Unobserved heterogeneity, caregiver 
characteristics 
Only in Germany do women providing care 









Author  Data  Controls  Key results 
Other studies 
 
Bittman et al. (2007) 4 waves of the Household Income and 
Labour Dynamics in Australia with up to 
7,500 observations 
OLS, probit, caregiver characteristics, 
descriptive comparison 
Caregivers show lower earnings and working 
hours, and starting caregiving is related to a 
higher probability of leaving the labor force 
Carmichael & Charles (2003)  N=10,000, General Household Survey 
(1990, C)  
Co- and extra-resident care, caregiver demo-
graphics  
Men (-12.9%) suffer less than women (-27%) 
in terms of employment probability. 
However, both face lower wages 
Carmichael et al. (2008)  N=272 respondents recruited among support 
groups & British Household Panel Survey 
(1991–2001, C)  
Hours and years of caregiving, caregiver 
demographics  
Longer hours and longer duration of care 
increase the likelihood of changing work 
hours or leaving employment completely 
Dautzenberg et al. (2000)  N=581, Telephone survey (1994 & 1996, L)  Distance to and health of care recipient, 
siblings, and caregiver demographics  
Unemployed daughters and daughters living 
nearby are more likely to become caregivers. 
Care and work hours are unrelated 
Gautun & Hagen (2010) Survey with 4,000 Norwegians between 45-
65 (2006, C) 
Descriptive univariate analysis 75% of caregivers experience problems 
combining work and caregiving, mostly in 
terms of irregular work hours and lack of 
participation in training and meetings  
Lee & Tang (2013)  N=5,119, Health and Retirement Study 
(2004, C)  
Spousal, parental, and grandchild care, 
demographics  
Parental personal care was associated with a 
significantly lower OR (0.49) for women. No 
effect emerged for men 
Lilly et al. (2010) Statistics Canada’s 2002, C, General Social 
Survey with 24,855 observations above 45 
 
Probit, two-stage Heckman procedure to 
account for selection in the wage/work hours 
regression, caregiver demographics 
The results suggest that it is mostly primary 
caregivers that show lower levels of labor 
force participation. Employed caregivers 
show neither lower working hours nor lower 
wages. Secondary caregivers seem 
unaffected 




Author  Data  Controls  Key results 
Pavalko & Henderson (2006) N = 2,021, National Longitudinal Survey of 
Young Women (1995-2001, L) 
Logit, caregiver characteristics, firm 
characteristics, work place benefits 
Caregiving women with more flexible 
working contracts were more likely to 
remain in the labor force  
Reid et al. (2010)  N=136, Employed caregivers from Victoria, 
British Columbia (1999–2000, C)  
– Caregiving might interfere with work in 
terms of quality, which is not measured 
through employment status or work hours 
Spiess & Schneider (2003)  N=6,400 women aged 45 to 59, European 
Community Household Panel Surveys (1994 
&1996, L)  
Cross-national comparison, focus on changes 
to control for selection, caregiver 
demographics  
Starting and increasing care lowers working 
hours, not vice versa. Results differ along a 
north-south gradient within Europe 
Ugreninov (2013) N =3,969 full-time worker from the 
Norwegian study of life course, ageing, and 
generation (2008, C)  
Probit, caregiver characteristics, work-place 
characteristics. 
Full-time caregivers have more absences for 
sickness and lower health than 
noncaregivers.  
Wakabayashi & Donato (2005)  N=2,638, Female subsample form the Na-
tional Survey of Family and Household 
(1987/88 & 1992-1994, L)  
Enter, remain, and quit caregiver role. Social 
demographics  
Substantial reduction in employment, work 
time, and earnings when becoming a 
caregiver. Ceasing to give care is not 
associated with any counteracting effect.  
2SLS= Two-stage least squares, C = Cross-section, IPW = Invers probability weighting, L = Longitudinal, OR = Odds ratio  
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The authors ascribe these differences to the more flexible work environment 
and higher levels of formal support, which allow female caregivers to adjust to the 
care situation and find a better balance between employment and informal care. 
Using the same data, Kotsadam (2011) conduct separate analyses for three 
European areas—north, central, and south—which support the notion of a north-
south gradient along which the effects of caregiving on female employment and 
work hours are generally smaller in the north than in the south (see also Ciani 2012). 
Different working environments, i.e. job options as flexible work hours, 
telecommuting, or compassionate care leave, affect labor force decisions even 
within a country: U.S. female caregiver with access to such arrangements are more 
likely to remain in the labor force (Pavalko & Henderson, 2006).  
2.3.2 Health  
Because informal care involves both psychological effort and a physical burden, 
some researchers distinguish between the psychological and physical health 
outcomes of caregiving, while others study both relations simultaneously (see table 
2.2). The majority of studies focus on psychological outcomes, although they 
employ different, and frequently ambiguous, dependent variables. Some 
investigations, for example, measure the correlation between caregiving and 
depression symptoms, while others analyze the links with subjective well-being, 
burden, and other mental health measures. Informal caregiving and psychological 
health are related not only because the former is time-consuming and frequently 
difficult to combine with work and family life, but because caring for close family 
members in need may induce negative emotions linked to compassion and fear of 
loss. In addition, caregiving is a stressful task that can require great physical effort, 
particularly in special cases such as mentally impaired relatives who develop 
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behavioral problems and even aggressive habits. Hence, policy-makers must be 
concerned not only with the self-evident interests of the individuals but also the 
poor caregiver health that can result from the informal care burden. This latter 
implies higher health care expenditures, which must be taken into account when 
promoting or supporting informal care arrangements. Poor health can also decrease 
caregivers’ capacity for care provision, leading to low quality care or a reduced 
informal care supply and increasing demands for formal care.  
 
Psychological Health  
Several meta-analyses that pay particular attention to the psychological implica-
tions (e.g. Schulz et al., 1990, 1995; Pinquart & Sörensen, 2003a, 2003b, 2006; 
Savage & Bailey, 2004) indicate that the majority of studies find a negative 
association between caregiving and psychological measures. Schulz et al. (1990), 
for example, review 33 articles published between 1968 and 1990 in order to 
identify the psychiatric morbidity effects of caregiving. Most of the work reviewed 
assesses these psychological effects using multi-item scales that include questions 
about general well-being or happiness. The evidence overall suggests that 
caregivers tend to show an above-average level of psychiatric symptoms. In a 
subsequent review, Schulz et al. (1995) concentrate on 41 papers, published from 
1989 to 1995, that focus on the well-being effects of caring for dementia patients, 
a form of care that places a high burden on the caregiver. Their general conclusion 
is that providing care for dementia patients leads to higher levels of depressive 
symptoms (see also Etters et al., 2008). 
A more recent review by Pinquart and Sörensen (2003a), which covers 228 
studies between 1966 and 2002, focuses on the psychological effects of elder care 
provision on the caregivers. These authors cluster the studies based on similar 
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characteristics related to outcome (caregiver burden or depression), sampling 
(probability or convenience samples), impairment (dementia, non-dementia, or 
mixed patients), and the relationship to the caregiver (spouse or adult children). 
They find overall evidence that behavioral problems (e.g., disruptive and aggressive 
behavior), physical and cognitive impairment, and the time spent on caregiving 
place a burden on the caregiver and increase symptoms of depression, with 
behavioral problems being particularly important when caring for demented care 
recipients. This finding is supported by Black and Almeida’s (2004) review of 
associations between behavioral and psychological symptoms of dementia and the 
burden on caregivers. They find a strong link with caregiver burden but, based on 
the weak correlation with depression, suggest that the concept of burden might be 
too broad to identify clinically relevant caregiving outcomes.  
Another review by Cooper et al. (2007), in contrast, finds that dementia care is 
associated with higher levels of caregiver anxiety. An overview by Savage and 
Bailey (2004) likewise examines the impact of caring on caregivers’ mental health 
but clusters relevant papers according to different factors associated with caregiver 
burden. They find that the care relationship is an important factor for mental health 
outcomes, with closer relationships inducing more positive outcomes for the 
caregiver. They also find evidence that mental impairment among care recipients 
negatively affects caregivers’ well-being, an effect enhanced by financial 
restrictions and lack of social support. The importance of such social support is 
emphasized by both Lim and Zebrack (2004), who discuss its relation to stress, and 
Chappell and Reid (2002), whose path analysis confirms that caregiver burden is a 
predictor for caregiver well-being and mediator of caregiving characteristics. The 
amount of care provision that is informal increases the probability of feeling 
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burdened and directly decreases well-being. Perceived social support and coping 
strategies reduce these downturns and increase caregiver well-being.  
A small stream of literature even finds that being a caregiver can have positive 
impacts. For example, Cohen et al. (2002) observe that 73% of their Canadian 
sample could name at least one positive aspect of caregiving, including 
companionship, fulfilment, and enjoyment. Experiencing such care outcomes, 
however, was negatively related to depression, burden, and self-assessed health. 
Qualitative interviews by Ashworth and Baker (2000) also reveal direct positive 
effects: about 40% of the caregivers expressed satisfaction with care provision (see 
also Raschick & Ingersoll-Dayton, 2004).  
Positive outcomes are, however, rare or at least dominated by negative effects. 
Yet it should be noted that negative impacts can suffer from an upward bias 
generated by failure to control for the so-called family effect (Bobinac et al., 2010): 
the influence of having a family member with bad health. This effect is one that 
many studies fail to consider, which raises the risk of bias in simple comparisons 
between caregivers and noncaregivers. To avoid such bias, studies should carefully 
distinguish between the family effect and the caregiving effect. Amirkhanyan and 
Wolf (2006), for instance, find that care provision in the household affects the well-
being of the entire family and simply having a parent in need of care increases the 
likelihood of depression. Likewise, Bobinac et al. (2010), after proxying the 
caregiver effect by the number of care tasks and the family effect by the actual 
health of the care recipient, show that both factors affect the caregiver’s well-being 
by a comparable magnitude. They also provide evidence that not accounting for the 
family effect leads to a 30% overestimation of the caregiving effect. One additional 
methodological shortcoming noted by Leigh (2010) is that most of the caregiving 
 35 
 
research fails to account for omitted variable bias by ignoring important individual 
characteristics. In his study, the negative effect on life satisfaction becomes 
insignificant when individual fixed-effects are taken into account. Lawton et 
al. (2000) also find very little evidence that becoming a caregiver or caring over a 
long period worsens the caregiver’s well-being.  
The long-term impact of providing care to an ill or disabled parent (or parent-
in-law) is a major focus of a study by Bookwala (2009), which draws on three waves 
of data collected over a 15-year period. Her research demonstrates that caregivers 
tend to suffer more over time, with well-being decreasing in the long term, which 
supports the so-called “wear-and-tear” concept when caregivers do not adapt to 
their role.16 Hirst (2005), in contrast, finds that particularly intense caregiving—
that is, providing more than 20 hours of care a week—is associated with the highest 
levels of distress when caregiving begins and after the caregiving spell has ended.  
Bookwala (2009) also reveals that women experience a higher probability of 
depression after a certain time of caring, whereas men’s depression levels decrease 
over the same amount of time. Female caregivers also generally report higher levels 
of depression, anxiety, and lower levels of well-being (Yee & Schulz, 2000), and 
the literature reviewed suggests almost exclusively stronger adverse effects for 
women than for men. Additional gender differences identified by Raschick and 
Ingersoll-Dayton (2004) using cross-sectional data include a tendency for women 
to be more burdened by the caregiving experience than men, to perceive more 
caregiving costs, and have lower levels of life satisfaction. Pinquart and 
Sörensen (2006), however, suggest that large gender differences can be partly 
                                                                
16  “Wear-and-tear” refers to an increasing psychological burden over time, while “adaption” 




explained by the fact that women tend to provide longer and more intense care. 
After accounting for the objective care burden in their meta-analysis of 229 studies, 
the remaining gender differences were small. 
Raschick and Ingersoll-Dayton (2004) find that adult children receive higher 
emotional rewards than spouses, possibly because of qualitative differences in the 
care situation; that is, spouses face more intensive responsibilities than do adult 
children. These observations are echoed by Pinquart and Sörensen (2003a), who 
find that spouses who provide care are often more burdened than adult children who 
act as caregivers, possibly because spousal caregivers, being older, find the physical 
effort more onerous. 
Physical Health  
Studies on caregiving’s impact on physical health are less widespread and have 
received less attention than studies on caregivers’ psychological health. This 
literature does show, however, that physical health outcomes can be linked to 
informal caregiving through the following dynamics: (i) caregiving often requires 
physically demanding work over a long duration, which might cause mus-
culoskeletal injuries and aggravation of arthritis and other chronic illnesses; (ii) 
caregivers tend to neglect a healthy lifestyle (e.g., diet and exercise); and (iii) 
caregiving increases stress and lowers psychological health, which is likely to 
manifest in such physical outcomes as hypertension and cardiovascular disease 
(Pinquart & Sörensen, 2007).  
A meta-study by Vitaliano et al. (2003), which explores caregiving’s impact on 
physical health in 23 samples, does indicate that caregivers have worse physical 
health than noncaregivers; however, their assessment of different health categories 
shows significant but moderate differences in self-reported health, medication use, 
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antibodies, and stress hormones. Another meta-analysis of the informal care 
literature, by Pinquart and Sörensen (2007), focuses exclusively on articles on 
physical health written between 1986 and the spring of 2006. In particular, this 
review concentrates on the following care-affiliated factors that specifically impact 
caregivers’ physical health: (i) mentally impaired care recipients and behavioral 
problems; (ii) characteristics of the care situation, such as care duration, co-
residency, nonspousal care, and lower levels of informal care support; (iii) the 
caregiver characteristics of high age and lower socioeconomic status; and (iv) a 
high caregiving burden and symptoms of caregiver depression. Based on their 
review, the authors conclude that physical health losses among caregivers are more 
likely to be related to their mental health status than to physical overload. They base 
this conclusion on the lack of a significant correlation between a care recipient’s 
physical impairment and the caregiver’s physical health status. At the same time, 
however, they also find a high correlation between a care recipient’s mental illness 
or a caregiver’s depression and physical health (see also, Schulz et al., 1995). As 
Pinquart and Sörensen (2007) point out, the most severe physical impairments can 
be found among caregivers who are older, male, or in charge of dementia patients, 
a risk group slightly different from those identified in the psychological health 
research, in which women in particular perceive a higher cost of caring (Raschick 
& Ingersoll-Dayton, 2004).  
The general association between informal care and worse health is demonstrated 
by Legg et al. (2013), who employ UK census data to reveal a significant negative 
association between care and health that becomes stronger with care hours provided 
(see also Ugreninov, 2013). Likewise, Mentzakis et al. (2009), using 14 waves of 
the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) to explore the determinants of 
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caregiving, identify a significant correlation between worse health and the 
probability that the caregiver is providing residential care. 
Dementia caregiving, in particular, is associated with a high burden and overall 
downturns in health, as demonstrated by Schoenmakers et al.’s (2010) meta-
analysis of its impact, which supports most of Pinquart and Sörensen’s (2007) 
observations. Nevertheless, although both reviews conclude that dementia 
caregiving is associated with lower physical health, they both admit to the following 
caveats: (i) the literature reviewed is very heterogeneous and therefore minimally 
comparable, (ii) most studies are cross-sectional and thus do not account for 
endogeneity, and (iii) research often omits important controls (e.g., preexisting 
illness).  
One particularly strong predictor of an individual’s own health is spousal health, 
which emerges prominently in all self-reported surveys, even in households where 
no care is needed (Satariano et al., 1984). At the same time, however, research 
results based on more objective measures like doctor visits and drug use remain 
ambiguous. In addition, although stressful caregiving may not overtly affect actual 
health status during the period of caring, it can be related to subsequent downturns 
in immune function. Such a lagged effect of caregiving is demonstrated by the 
sample of single mothers providing intergenerational care in which physical 
downturns like lower self-assessed health and high blood pressure occurred after a 
2- to 4-year delay (Coe & Van Houtven, 2009). Similarly, in a study by Gräsel 
(2002), although caregivers experienced no health decrease over the caregiving 
period, after leaving the caregiver role, they experienced uplifts in health but nearly 
twice as many doctor visits, which the author interprets as a strengthened awareness 
of their own health, neglected while a caregiver. 
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In contrast to these mostly negative associations, other studies draw a more 
ambivalent picture. For example, Vlachantoni et al. (2012), in their review of 
caregiving’s impact on health measures in Britain, underscore the ambiguous 
results on caregiver characteristics. In an analysis of the differences between cross-
sectional and longitudinal studies, they also find that, depending on the sample and 
model used, cross-sectional analyses may find positive, negative, or no correlation. 
In particular, they highlight a study by O’Reilly et al. (2008), based on a sample 
from the Northern Ireland Census, which shows that caregiving is related both to 
poorer health and lower levels of physical impairment and mortality. Although this 
link between caregiving and lower mortality is supported elsewhere (Brown et al., 
2003), Schulz and Beach (1999) demonstrate that mortality rates are higher among 
caregivers who report emotional strain than among noncaregivers. On the other 
hand, caregivers who do not report a high burden from their tasks seem to have the 
same mortality risk as the comparison group. O’Reilly et al. (2008) therefore 
conclude that previous literature underestimates the positive health outcomes 
associated with caregiving.  
One possible explanation for this ambiguous outcome is that caregiving can 
induce a psychological uplift that may increase physical health by enhancing well-
being (Ashworth & Baker, 2000). Another explanation may be self-selection out of 
the caregiver role when the severity of the physical impairment makes care 
impossible. In such cases, public support could provide different options for 
selecting out of the caregiver role when the adverse health effects become too 
severe or at least reduce the care intensity. Empirical evidence for this notion is 
provided by Dujardin et al. (2011), who show in a country comparison that a heavy 
care burden, although more prevalent in Britain than in Belgium, has a less adverse 
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health effect for British caregivers, probably because of the better public support. 
If researchers are to avoid biased results, therefore, they must additionally account 
for self-selection into caring. For example, although it seems rational to assume that 
when caregivers have free choice, only those with robust health are likely to become 
caregivers, Coe and Van Houtven (2009) find decreased self-rated health measures 
for both male and female care providers even after they account for self-selection.  
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Table 2.2: Studies on Informal Care and Health 
Author  Data  Controls  Key results 
Literature review or meta study 
Black & Almeida (2004) Review of 30 cross-sectional (meta-analysis) 
and 12 longitudinal (1990-2001) 
– Behavioral and psychological symptoms of 
dementia correlate with caregiver burden, but 
only to a small degree with depression  
Cooper et al. (2007)  Review of 32 studies (1988-2005) – One fourth of dementia caregivers reported 
clinically significant anxiety levels, higher 
than the noncaregiver controls. Coping, 
perceived burden, and physical health were 
the only clear associations found 
Etters et al. (2008)  Review of literature (1996-2006) – The dementia caregiving burden leads to 
deterioration of caregiver health, which can 
result in early nursing home placement 
Lim & Zebrack (2004) Review of 19 studies (1987-2004) – Care receiver and caregiver characteristics, 
coping methods, and social support are 
predictors for caregiver quality of life 
measures  
Pinquart & Sörensen (2003a)  Review of 228 studies(1966–2002)  – Behavioral problems, physical and cognitive 
impairment, and care time increase 
depression, and spouses who provide care are 
often more burdened than adult children 
Pinquart & Sörensen (2003b) Review of 84 studies(1987-2002) – A comparison of caregivers with 
noncaregivers shows significantly lower 
mental health but only small differences in 
physical health. Dementia caregiving had 
stronger effects  
   Continued on next page 
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Author  Data  Controls  Key results 
Pinquart & Sörensen (2006) Meta-analysis of 229 studies (1983- 2005)  – Differences between female and male carers 
were small. Women perceived greater 
adverse effects of care with regards to 
burden, depression, well-being, and physical 
health 
 
Pinquart & Sörensen (2007)  Review of 176 articles (1982-2006)  – Reasons for physical downturns can be found 
in psychological associations with care. 
Being older, male, or a dementia caregivers 
increases the risk for physical health 
problems 
Savage & Bailey (2004)  Review of 26 studies (1979–2002)  – Care recipient disabilities and residency 
influence the impact of caring on the 
caregiver. 
Schoenmakers et al. (2010)  Review of 207 articles on dementia caregiver 
(1990-2009)  
– Caregiver characteristics are more important 
for the observed negative impact on health 
than for objective care needs. 
Schulz et al. (1990)  Review of 33 articles (1978–1990)  – Caregivers tend to have higher levels of 
psychiatric symptoms than the average 
population 
Schulz et al. (1995)  Review of 41 articles (1989–1995)  – Substantial evidence in the literature that 
dementia caregiving leads to higher levels of 
depression  
   Continued on next page 
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Author  Data  Controls  Key results 
Vlachantoni et al. (2012)  Review of 20 studies (1992-2012)  – Caregiver characteristics are important; lon-
gitudinal designs tend to show less severe ef-
fects on health outcomes  
Vitaliano et al. (2003) Meta-analysis of studies 45, based on 23 
samples of dementia caregivers (1987-1999)  
– Small but significant correlation with several 
health outcomes, including subjective self-
assessed health and objective measures (e.g., 
biomarkers) 
Yee & Schulz (2000) Review of 30 reports (1985-1998) – Caregivers report higher psychiatric 
morbidity than noncaregivers. A gender 
comparison shows women are more affected 
than men.  
Studies accounting for or ruling out endogeneity and/or account for unobserved heterogeneity 
Coe & Houtven (2009)  N=3316, subsamples of the Health and Re-
tirement Survey (1992-2004, L)  
Dynamic model, instrumental variables, 
random-and fixed-effects, family re-
lationship, caregiver demographics  
Negative impacts on physical health emerge 
with a 2-year delay  
Amirkhanyan & Wolf (2006)  N=7,009, Health Retirement Study 
(1996,1998, 2000, L)  
Family relations, care recipient ADL, 
caregiver demographics, random-effects  
Generally, noncaregivers whose parents need 
money for transportation are more likely to 
show symptoms of depression than 
caregivers without disabled relatives. 
Other studies 
Ashworth & Baker (2000)  N=23, Qualitative interviews with caregivers  – About 40% of caregivers report positive 
outcomes of caregiving  
   Continued on next page 
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Author  Data  Controls  Key results 
Bookwala (2009)  N=716, National Survey of Families and 
Households (1987/88, 1992/94, 2001/02, L)  
Selection into caregiving, caregiver 
demographics  
In contrast to female caregivers, males show 
a decline in depression symptoms over time. 
Experienced caregivers are significantly less 
happy in their marriages than recent 
caregivers 
Chappell & Reid (2002)  N=243, telephone interviews in British 
Columbia, Canada , C)  
SEM models, care recipient characteristics, 
caregiver demographics  
Perceived social support (+), self-esteem (+), 
informal care hours (-), and burden (-) have a 
significant influence on caregivers’ mental 
health 
Cohen et al. (2002) N=289, subsample from the Canadian Study 
of Health and Aging (1996, C) 
Stepwise regression, caregiving relationship, 
residency, care receiver, caregiver age, and 
gender 
73% of caregivers perceive at least one 
positive outcome of caregiving, which 
positively affects mental and physical health 
Dujardin et al. (2011) Census data from Britain (N=1,361,222) and 
Belgium (N=4,368,637) 
Logit, caregiver characteristics, regional 
matching 
Caregiving is more prevalent in Britain than 
in Belgium, but British caregiver have better 
health 
Gräsel (2002)  N=681, caregivers, re-interviewed after 
12 months  
MANOVA  Terminating the caregiver role is associated 
with uplifts in health and frequency of doctor 
visits  
Hirst (2005)  N=25,000, British Household Panel Survey 
(1991-2000, L) 
Logit, care intensity, care duration, care 
location, and relationship 
Starting or leaving intense caregiving is 
associated with high psychological distress  
Lawton et al. (2000)  N=634, Volunteer female sample (1990–
1994, C)  
MANOVA, comparison of new and veteran 
caregivers  
Only a small amount of evidence exists for a 
negative link between caregiving and 
subjective well-being 
Legg et al. (2013)  N=44,465,833, UK Census (2001, C, 
including 5,451,902 caregivers)  Level of caregiving, caregiver demographics  
Caregivers providing more than 20 hours 
care per week report lower levels of health 
   Continued on next page  
    
 
45 
Author  Data  Controls  Key results 
Mentzakis et al. (2009) N=84,000, British Household Panel Survey 
(1991-2004, L) 
Estimates supply of care, lagged care, 
caregivers, household, and formal care 
controls 
The extensive margin shows a negative 
significant correlation between health and the 
probability to provide care  
O’Reilly et al. (2008)  N=974,450, Northern Ireland Census (2001, 
C)  
Level of caregiving, caregiver demographics  Caregivers show lower levels of mortality 
than noncaregivers. The effect is especially 
large for female, older, and generally sick 
caregivers 
Raschick & Ingersoll-Dayton (2004)  N=978, National Long-Term Care 
Survey(1999, C)  
Two-step hierarchical regression, care 
recipient disabilities, relationship, caregiver 
gender  
Women perceive more caregiving costs than 
men, and adult children receive higher 
emotional rewards than spouses  
Schulz & Beach (1999)  N=819 aged 66-96 years for four US 
communities (1993-1998, L)  
Caregiver baseline health with a 4-year 
follow-up, caregiver demographics  
Perceiving a high burden from caregiving in-
creases mortality risk  







2.3.3 Family Implications  
Caregiving competes with leisure time, which is usually spent with family members 
and helps maintain healthy family relationships. The time for leisure, however, is 
drastically shortened when caregiving lasts for hours or must be combined with a 
regular workday. Caring for co-residing elderly, in particular, not only influences a 
family’s daily life but decreases the well-being of both caregivers and their family 
members (Amirkhanyan & Wolf, 2006). Yet the effect of caregiving on the entire 
family has received only marginal attention in the research. The few studies that do 
exist (see table 2.3) focus especially on informal caregiving’s effect on married 
couples. For example, Bookwala (2009)17 finds that among a sample of adult 
caregiving daughters and sons, experienced caregivers are significantly less happy 
in their marriages than those who have just assumed the caregiving role.18 Likewise, 
former caregivers experience greater differences than recent caregivers, long-term 
caregivers experience more than noncaregivers, and, in terms of gender inequality, 
these effects are stronger for females in both groups. These findings are consistent 
with the already cited research showing that it takes time for the impacts of 
caregiving to manifest in any measurable magnitude and that downturns in overall 
life satisfaction come to include downturns in satisfaction with family life.  
On the other hand, Litvin et al. (1995) argue that if care provision is exogenous, 
then the double burden perceived by married caregivers can be counterbalanced by 
spousal support in the caregiving process. In fact, Brody et al. (1995) do find that 
well-being among married caregivers is highest, while never-married caregivers are 
                                                                
17  For details, see Table 2.2. 
18  Bookwala (2009) observed three caregiver groups in three waves: T1 (1987–1988), T2 (1992–
1994), and T3 (2001–2002). Caregivers in T1 were subjected to a baseline interview, 
"experienced caregivers" provided care in T2 and T3, but only "former caregivers" provided care 
in T2 and only "recent caregivers" in T3. 
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less likely to co-reside with parents than their married counterparts. Moreover, 
although married daughters do not differ significantly from separated and divorced 
female caregivers in terms of co-residency, there are directional differences: 
whereas most of the latter have moved back into their parents’ home, the majority 
of married caregivers co-reside in their own dwelling. This pattern appears to be 
driven by the opportunity to provide better care, on the one hand, and by financial 
problems, on the other, particularly in the case of divorced daughters. In fact, Young 
and Grundy (2008), using data for England and Wales, find that the share of 
caregivers is higher among the never married than among married or formerly 
married men and women.  
In an attempt to describe the decision-making process within the family, Pezzin 
and Schone (1999) develop a theoretical model in which parents and their children 
(in this case, only daughters) both agree to a Nash bargaining rule by which the 
household formation itself is endogenous. 




Table 2.3: Studies on Informal Care and Family 
Author  Data  Controls  Key results 
Brody et al. (1995) U.S. sample of 364 daughters sharing households with 
their elderly parents 
ANOVA, linear regression, 
caregiver and care receiver 
characteristics.  
Married daughters fared best in well-being, which may 
be related to higher income, social support, and more 
helpers in caregiving. 
Litvin et al. (1995) U.S. sample of 522 primary caregiving daughters ANOVA Even though the family can support caregivers, 
married women suffer most from competing demands 
of caregiving 
Young & Grundy (2008) N=110,464, UK Census data from the Office for 
National Statistics Longitudinal Study (1981-2001, L) 
Logit, caregiver characteristics Singles might be more likely to provide care because 
of financially limited access to formal care. Women 
showing lower attachment to the labor force after child 
birth were more likely to become caregivers 
Pezzin & Schone (1999) 424 parent (60+)-daughter pairs from the Hebrew 
Rehabilitation Center for the Aged (HRCA) Survey of 
the Elderly and HRCA-NBER Child Survey (1986-87, 
C)  
Maximum likelihood, parent 
and child characteristics 
Children select into the caregiver and co-residing roles 
based on opportunity costs: employment and 
competing demands  
ANOVA = Analysis of Variance 
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Both parents and daughters want to maximize their utility dependent on 
altruism, informal care, formal care, and leisure time and will only co-reside if both 
parties derive positive utility from this solution. Maximal family consumption 
depends on satisfaction of the parents’ care needs by allowing the daughter to (i) 
provide informal care herself and trade off leisure or (ii) increase financial transfers 
for a formal care solution. Substitution between the two choices depends on the 
daughter’s wage, with higher opportunity costs for care leading to a lower 
probability of providing informal care and therefore shared residency. The authors 
test their theoretical approach using a complete data set of 424 parent-daughter pairs 
from Israel. Their estimates show significantly negative coefficients for married 
daughter, daughter’s age, and number of daughter’s children. For married parents, 
the likelihood of co-residency is small but increases significantly with degree of 
parent impairment. 
2.4 Conclusions  
As an aging population increases the demand for caregiving, societies are being 
forced to develop strategies for providing a sufficient supply of care, a large share 
of which is informal. Hence, to formulate successful policies, policy-makers must 
be aware not only of the social implications of informal care’s effects on the 
caregiver but of the economic consequences of changes within the care 
arrangements. Yet although the implications for the job market have become of 
major interest to researchers in recent years, the findings on informal caregiving’s 
overall effect remain ambiguous. Whereas most studies report a negative link 
between care and employment, some relate a reduction in employment or work 
hours only to specific characteristics, with female co-residing caregivers being the 
most affected. The magnitude of these effects, however, appears rather small: 
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caregivers seem to have a lower attachment to the labor force even before they enter 
the caregiver role. Likewise, the probability of informal caregivers being employed 
is at most 5–10% lower than that for noncaregivers. Stronger effects could be 
obtained for very intense caregiving, which is provided primarily by females of 
working age, who are less likely to be fully employed and earn generally lower 
wages. Only high family income and strong social support enables families to freely 
choose an arrangement that is satisfying to all family members, so willingness to 
care remains a result of circumstances. Even with full employment, low wealth and 
no alternatives within the family increase the pressure to provide care (Carmichael 
et al., 2008). 
For psychological health measures, the results are more homogeneous: the 
majority of studies find a negative impact of caregiving on mental health. That is, 
even though caregiving can create psychological uplifts, the negative consequences 
tend to dominate, particularly for female and spousal caregivers. Such negative 
outcomes not only affect the caregiver per se but also the caregiver’s family. As 
regards physical health, there is less conclusive evidence for specific risk groups 
within the literature: the general negative association of caregiving and physical 
health outcomes is often related to psychological downturns.  
The link between marital status and caregiving is twofold: first, married 
caregivers seem to cope best with the caregiving burden, possibly because of more 
social support and a better financial situation. Second, the generally accepted reality 
that too much stress can harm a relationship also holds for caregiving, in which a 
longer duration of care negatively affects marital satisfaction. Nevertheless, the 
empirical findings are sparse, so further research is needed.  
It should also be noted that the three categories analyzed in this paper 
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(employment, health, and family) mutually affect each other. For example, 
occupation and marital status both affect health levels while poor health is linked 
to both unemployment and working overtime (Bell et al., 2012; Brown et al., 2012), 
but being married is associated with higher levels of both income (Antonovics & 
Town, 2004) and health (Helmert & Shea, 1998). As important, these effects are 
not only cumulative but may spill over into other domains and reinforce each other. 
For instance, combining full-time work and care can be related to lower health 
(Farfan-Potret et al., 2009) or a higher usage of antidepressants (Schmitz & 
Stroka, 2013). Likewise, downturns in psychological health generated by the 
caregiving burden could affect work performance and thus increase the risk of 
unemployment, which is itself a psychological stressor. Obviously, these linkages 
are complex and require sophisticated analysis if the different effects are to be 
isolated. 
The majority of existing studies, however, are subject to methodological 
shortcomings, including nonrepresentative or small samples, limited use of control 
variables (Bobinac et al., 2010), and widespread use of cross-sectional analyses 
(Schulz et al., 1990). In particular, because decisions to provide care can be 
endogenous with the outcomes of interest (Coe & Van Houtven, 2009), not 
accounting for selection in and out of the caregiver role or simultaneous decision-
making biases empirical findings. Nevertheless, with regard to employment, recent 
studies raise doubts about the endogeneity of its relationship with care (e.g., Bolin 
et al., 2008b; Ciani, 2012; Meng, 2012; Van Houtven et al., 2013; Nguyen & 
Connelly, 2014) or criticize the approach being used (Hassink & Van den Berg, 
2011). Nor should analyses be restricted to the individual caregiver: if studies are 
to obtain conclusive evidence on the effects of caregiving, they must also 
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incorporate caregivers’ families and formally supported alternatives (Amirkhanyan 
& Wolf, 2006).  
Today, such alternatives to informal care are finding an increasing market and 
are, to some extent, available in all developed countries. With the right public 
policies, therefore, formal support can relieve caregivers (Bolin et al., 2008a) and 
help care receivers avoid hospitalization (Bonsang, 2009; Jiménez-Martín & Prieto, 
2012). However, because caregiving arrangements are heterogeneous, flexible 
public support is needed that is adaptable to caregiver needs. Based on our analysis, 
we draw two conclusions related to achieving this goal: first, even though the 
individual outcomes on employment and health seem rather small, the literature 
suggests that the effects of caregiving are mostly negative. Such negative outcomes 
must therefore be considered part of the cost of informal care when defining the 
opportunity costs of formal care subsidies. Second, most studies reviewed find that 
the caregiver burden is higher for women than for men. One contributory factor 
may be that traditional gender roles place greater pressure on women to commit to 
the caregiver role, even though they face relatively higher caregiving costs, 
different expectations that contribute to the existing gender wage gap. As demand 
rises, it seems likely that, despite increasing female labor force participation and 
the softening of traditional gender roles, women will be more at risk of having to 
deal with a family member in need of care.   
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Because of an ageing population and declining fertility rates, the topic of informal 
care for the elderly is gaining in importance. This paper uses panel data from the 
German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) to analyze the effects of informal care 
provision on caregivers’ subjective well-being. We also disentangle the effects of 
long-term care arrangements to provide insights into the ambiguous findings 
reported in the literature on long-term care effects on subjective well-being. 
Specifically, we show that the time spent caring has a non-linear effect, with 
subjective well-being declining in the first years of care provision but then 
increasing again, and that more care time is generally associated with lower levels 
of subjective well-being, albeit primarily in individuals born between 1920 and 
1959. As regards the relation between well-being and caregiver co-residency, we 
find only a negative association, which supports either the “wear-and-tear” or 
“adaptation” models, depending on whether care time or residency is the subject of 
analysis. The amount of income needed to compensate a caregiver’s loss in well-




                                                                
19  The following paper is a single authored manuscript by the candidate and yet unpublished. The 
author wants to thank several persons for their insightful comments during academic seminars 
and conferences: members of the Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences - 
particularly the colleagues from the Institute of Health Care & Public Management - at the 
University of Hohenheim and the Oxford Institute of Population Ageing. Additionally, all 
participants of the ISQOLS Conference 2012, the XVI Applied Economics Meeting 2013, and 
the ESPE Conference 2013, who helped to improve this paper.  
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3.1 Introduction 
Germany’s ageing population has been the most important contributing factor to 
the steady rise in individuals needing care from the German Long-Term Care 
Insurance (LTCI), who now number about two and a half million. This demand for 
care, which has risen 4% in only 2 years (Federal Ministry of Health, 2009), will 
most probably continue to increase in the coming decades, with more than four 
million patients predicted to need long-term care by 2050 (Hackmann & Moog, 
2008). At the same time, the supply of caregivers (CG) is declining for a number of 
reasons. First, with increasing female education and employment, female CGs (who 
have traditionally provided most of the care) are facing higher opportunity costs of 
informal care (Thome & Birkel, 2005). At the same time, the persistently low 
fertility rate in Germany is decreasing the number of potential CGs for older 
generations, meaning that the burden of intergenerational care is now distributed 
among fewer children, which increases the individual share. This latter effect is 
further reinforced by the children’s mobility: today’s families tend to be more 
geographically distributed than in the past (Röß, 2011), making daily care provision 
more difficult. In addition, women not only have fewer children than in the past, 
they also have them later in life, which, combined with children remaining longer 
in the parental home, often means that women are still burdened by their own 
children in their 50s, which makes caring for elderly parents more difficult. Finally, 
higher divorce rates have led to more single elderly households (Mager & Eisen, 
2002), meaning no partner on whom individuals in need of care can rely. 
This probable increase in demand accompanied by a decrease in supply has led 
policy makers to seriously reassess the role of formal versus informal care in 
Germany (Campbell et al., 2009), not least because formal care is considerably 
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more costly for the LTCI than informal care. In fact, to keep LTCI insurance 
premiums as low as possible the German Social Law stipulates that informal care 
must take priority over any other stationary care arrangements20. Hence, to promote 
domestic care solutions, policy makers have recently introduced new legislation 
that – in addition to the financial benefits already in place – provides further 
incentives for prolonged home treatment aimed at reducing the negative impact on 
CGs’ careers21.  
Such informal care solutions are also usually preferred to formal care by most 
care receivers (CRs) and CGs (Schneekloth & Leven, 2003). Yet even if relatives 
provide informal care voluntarily, this duty constitutes a burden whose physical and 
psychological toll is empirically well documented (Schulz et al., 1990, 1995; 
Pinquart & Sörensen, 2003). For example, one strand of the (primarily medical) 
literature assesses how providing informal care affects the subjective well-being 
(SWB) of CGs (see, e.g., George & Gwyther, 1986; Yates et al., 1999; Yee & 
Schulz, 2000; Chappell & Reid, 2002; Bookwala, 2009), showing that, despite 
major differences in magnitude, caregiving is generally associated with a decline in 
well-being. Other empirical studies, in contrast, document positive psychological 
effects of caregiving (i.e., Kramer, 1997). These differing results are variously 
attributed to “wear-and-tear,” the erosion of CGs’ resources and well-being over 
time by the accumulation of caregiving demands, or to the long-term effects being 
driven by CGs’ “adaptation” to their new situation, making the negative effects only 
short-lived (Brickman & Campbell,1971).  Overall, however, the results from 
                                                                
20 See §3 of the German Social Law (Sozialgesetzbuch, SGB). 
21  LTCI benefits are regulated under SGB §36 -37; new legislation can be found in the German 
Care Time Law (Pflegezeitgesetz) 
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longitudinal studies on caregiving’s long-term impact on well-being are 
inconsistent (Bookwala, 2009). 
Such inconsistency is perhaps not surprising given that this literature, albeit 
extensive, is hampered by a number of methodological and design problems, 
including the (nearly exclusive) use of cross-sectional data, unrepresentative data 
sets, and unreliable statistical methods that report simple correlation coefficients. 
These latter fail to take into account the impact of other potential SWB 
determinants, while the regression analyses using cross-sectional data allow no 
conclusion of causality because of omitted and unobservable personal 
characteristics. Moreover, most studies rely on self-reports (of SWB and informal 
care), meaning that the association identified between informal care and SWB could 
in fact be driven by “third factors” like personality traits of neuroticism, hardiness, 
extroversion, or negative affectivity; and most analyze specific populations, making 
generalizations problematic. 
Our paper, besides being, to our knowledge, the first representative analysis of 
the effects of informal care on CGs’ well-being in Germany, contributes to this 
research stream by examining the relation between informal care and SWB in a way 
that remedies some of the above shortcomings. Most particularly, our use of a rich 
set of covariates in the regression analysis partially eliminates the impact of other 
SWB determinants that may potentially correlate with eldercare provision. 
Likewise, our use of 10 years of data from the GSOEP allows us to control for such 
unobservable individual characteristics as affectivity, thereby enabling more 
convincing conclusions about causality.  
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The paper is structured as follows: the next section reviews the pertinent 
literature on the effects of care on CGs’ SWB. Section 3 then describes the data and 
methodology. Section 4 reports the results, and section 5 concludes the paper. 
3.2 Prior Research22 
Medical and gerontological research, which began addressing the effects of 
domestic caregiving on CGs in the late 1970s (George & Gwyther, 1986; Kramer, 
1997), has generated a rich body of literature focused on such diverse outcome 
variables as CGs’ SWB (George & Gwyther, 1986; Yates et al., 1999; Yee & 
Schulz, 2000; Chappell & Reid, 2002; Bookwala, 2009), employment (Heitmueller, 
2010), and even marital relations (Bookwala, 2009). Given our research interest, 
we concentrate particularly on the literature that focuses on SWB. 
Several meta-analyses give an overview of this literature with particular 
attention to its psychological implications. A study by Schulz et al. (1990), for 
example, reviews 33 articles from 1968 to 1990 in order to identify the psychiatric 
morbidity effects caused by caregiving. Most of the studies reviewed assess these 
psychological effects using multi-item scales that include questions about general 
well-being or happiness. Although the evidence overall suggests that CGs tend to 
show above-average psychiatric symptoms, the findings are far from conclusive 
because of major methodological shortcomings. In a subsequent review, Schulz and 
colleagues (1995) concentrate on 41 papers, published between 1990 and 1995, that 
focus on the well-being effects of caring for dementia patients – a form of care that 
places a high burden on CGs. Their general conclusion is that providing care for 
dementia patients leads to higher levels of depressive symptoms.  
                                                                
22 This section partly relies on an earlier version of Bauer and Sousa-Poza (2015) 
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A more recent review by Pinquart and Sörensen (2003a), which covers 228 
studies between 1966 and 2002, focuses on the psychological effects of elderly 
caregiving on the CGs. These authors cluster the studies based on similar 
characteristics related to outcome (CG burden or depression), sampling (probability 
or convenience samples), impairment (dementia, non-dementia, or mixed patients), 
and relationship to the CG (spouse or adult children). They find overall evidence 
that behavioral problems (i.e., disruptive and aggressive behavior), physical and 
cognitive impairment, and the time spent on caregiving burdens the CG and 
increases symptoms of depression, with behavioral problems being particularly 
important when caring for demented CRs.23 They also report that spouses who 
provide care are often more burdened than adult children who act as caregivers. 
Savage and Bailey (2004) likewise examine the impact of caring on CGs’ mental 
health, but cluster relevant papers from primarily medical databases according to 
different factors associated with CGs’ burden. They find that the care relationship 
is an important factor for mental health outcomes, with closer relationships 
inducing more positive outcomes for the CG. They also find evidence that mental 
impairment among CRs negatively affects CGs’ well-being, an effect enhanced by 
financial restrictions and lack of social support.  
To assess the impact of caregiving on general well-being, George and Gwyther 
(1986) apply four generic categories – physical health, mental health (which also 
contains a single-item measure of life satisfaction), social participation, and 
financial resources – to a sample of family members caring for memory-impaired 
                                                                
23  The relationship between adult children and their parents, however, is often shaped by conflicting 




older adults. Specifically, these authors compare CGs’ overall SWB to adjusted 
values from other population-based samples in order to calculate the difference in 
well-being between CGs and random community samples of non-CGs. Their final 
sample consists of 510 family CGs, who have a 20% lower level of self-reported 
life satisfaction than the control group. The authors conclude that the CGs’ burden 
is driven primarily by their relatively lower levels of mental health and social 
participation.  
More recent research focuses not only on the negative outcomes of caregiving 
but also increasingly on its positive effects, which tend to be perceived indirectly. 
That is, it is not the actual care task that (directly) triggers higher satisfaction but 
rather the feeling of having provided care and done something good (McDaid, 
2001). For example, Ashworth and Baker (2000) ask 23 CGs aged between 14 and 
85 in London about how they experience their care arrangement and what they think 
about respite care. They report that about 40% of the CGs interviewed expressed 
positive satisfaction with care provision. According to Chappell and Reid (2002), 
in their path analysis of 243 CGs identified by random-dialing in British Columbia, 
Canada, such experience may be influenced by social support and coping strategies, 
while the number of hours that informal care is provided increases the probability 
of being burdened and directly decreases CG well-being.  
Amirkhanyan and Wolf (2006), using data from three waves of the Health 
Retirement Study (3,350 men and 3,659 women), further point to an age effect: 
older CGs seem to show lower symptoms of depression than younger CGs. 
Nevertheless, care provision affects the well-being of the entire family and having 
a parent in need of care increases the likelihood of depression. This effect, they 
argue, is one that many studies fail to consider, an omission that leads to a risk of 
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bias in simple comparisons between CGs and non-CGs, which cannot clearly 
differentiate whether well-being is derived from care provision care or influenced 
by having a family member with bad health.  
Depression and impact on the family are also a major focus of Bookwala's 
(2009) study of the long-term impact of providing care to an ill or disabled parent 
(or parent-in-law), which draws on three waves of data collected over a 15-year 
period and a probability-based sample drawn from the National Survey of Families 
and Households (N = 716). Using well-being and marital quality as outcome 
indicators, this author finds some support for the wear-and-tear model, showing a 
decline in CGs’ marital quality over time. In terms of depression symptoms, her 
research also shows different outcomes for men and women: women experience a 
higher probability of depression after a certain time of caring, whereas men’s 
depression levels decrease over the same amount of time. Such gender differences 
are also illustrated by Raschick and Ingersoll-Dayton (2004), who use a cross-
sectional subsample of 978 CGs from the 1999 National Long-Term Care Survey 
to compare the perceptions of men versus women. They report that women perceive 
more caregiving costs than men, tend be more burdened by caregiving experience, 
and show lower levels of life satisfaction. They also find that adult children receive 
higher emotional rewards than spouses, which may stem from the qualitative 
differences in the care situation; that is, spouses face more intensive responsibilities 
than do adult children. 
This research overview, although it refers mostly to findings for the U.S. with 
only limited evidence for other countries, suggests several conclusions. First, in line 
with theoretical reasons to expect both a positive and a negative effect of caregiving 
on CGs’ well-being, as well as differences in sampling strategy, duration of study, 
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and type of care experiences examined (Bookwala, 2009), the empirical evidence 
is mixed. Second, the majority of studies are subject to several methodological 
shortcomings, including non-representative samples, small sample sizes, limited 
use of control variables, and widespread use of cross-sectional analyses. According 
to Leigh (2010), for example, most of the caregiving research fails to account for 
omitted variable bias by ignoring important individual characteristic. His study, 
which uses 7 years of panel data from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics 
in Australia survey (N = 10,000), controls for individual fixed effects and identifies 
no significant impact of caring on CG’s well-being.  
3.3 Methodological Issues and Data 
Data 
This analysis is based on the GSOEP24, a survey administered by the German 
Institute for Economic Research, which provides a rich longitudinal data set. Begun 
in 1984, by 2010, the GSOEP incorporated 27 annual waves, had more than doubled 
its sample size over time, and covered 22,870 individuals (based on individual 
questionnaires). The GSOEP survey asks questions of all household members older 
than 16 years and also administers a household questionnaire (HQ) to heads of 
household on behalf of all household members (there were 16,099 households in 
2010). Households are picked by regionally pooled multi-stage sampling, combined 
with a random walk selection. For detailed information about the survey, see Huber 
et al. (2011).  
 
 
                                                                
24 The data used in this paper was extracted using the Add-On package PanelWhiz for 
Stata.PanelWhiz (http://www.PaneIWhiz.eu) was written by Dr. John P.Haisken-DeNew 
(john@PaneIWhiz.eu). See Haisken-DeNew and Hahn (2006) for details. 
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Variables 
Although the survey began as far back as 2001 to include a question on the hours 
spent on “care and support of persons in need of care”, semantically, the question 
in German differs slightly from the English translation25. That is, the word “pflege” 
is more of a medical term than “care” and focuses primarily on nursing tasks. This 
same section also asks about the time spent on housework (washing, cleaning, and 
cooking), particularly child care, implying that these tasks are most probably not 
covered by the care variable. In addition, the questionnaire only includes this 
question for a typical weekday in each wave and only asks about time spent caring 
on a typical Saturday or Sunday every second year. Hence, creating the main 
independent variable of “care time” poses two main challenges.  
First, an approximation is needed to estimate the time spent on caregiving on 
weekends in those waves that do not include this question. Although theoretically, 
we could simply use the workday values for weekends, this method proves 
unsatisfactory because time spent on care on the weekends differs significantly 
from that spent during workdays.26 We therefore impute the values from past waves 
for which all three variables are available; for example, we use 2001 values for the 
weekends in 2002. Second, the values for our care time variable, which represents 
the time spent weekly on caring for a dependent person, range from 0 to 168 hours, 
meaning that some respondents reported spending every hour of the week caring 
for a dependent person. These numbers suggest that people interpret care not only 
as physical care tasks but also as supervision of their protégé. Given that earlier 
studies report higher hours of care time for people with mental health problems who 
                                                                
25  The German formulation being: “Versorgung und Betreuung von pflegebedürftigen Personen”. 
26  Two-way t-tests show significantly higher means in every wave for weekend care time. 
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cannot be left unattended at any time (Ory et al., 1999), we do not exclude these 
observations from our estimation.  
For our main measure of well-being,27 we use responses to the question on 
overall life satisfaction, available in every wave, which participants rank on a 10-
point scale from 0 (completely dissatisfied) to 10 (completely satisfied). If the pure 
effect of the informal care burden on CG’s well-being is to be estimated, however, 
it is crucial that we control for all other variables that affect it; specifically, the main 
socioeconomic determinants of SWB (Diener et al., 1999; Blanchflower & Oswald, 
2008), including age, health, income, education, marital status, employment, and 
children in the household. In addition, because our panel analysis must necessarily 
be based on waves 18 (2001) to 27 (2010), for which we have care time data, we 
also include wave dummies.  
As regards CR characteristics, the information in the GSOEP is limited; that is, 
the data set includes information about a care recipient only if that recipient is living 
in the household covered by the GSOEP. All 27 waves28 do, however, include data 
from a section of the HQ that explicitly poses questions on informal care situations, 
such as the type of care received and the relationship to the CG. Hence, to 
investigate the impact of residency, we add a dummy indicating whether or not a 
CR lives in the household, which allows us to measure the effect of “care time” 
separately from a CR’s place of residence. Finally, to shed light on the “wear-and-
tear” versus “adaptation” models, we investigate the long-term effects of providing 
                                                                
27  For a discussion of the problems in measuring well-being, see Peichl and Pestel (2012); Juster 
and Stafford (1991); Warr (1990).  
28  Because the design of the GSOEP does not provide a direct link between CG  and CR information 
in the HQ, we assume that a CG who spends some time on care and has a CR in the household 
(who receives family care) devotes all care time reported to this relative. Such an approximation 
will only create a bias if an additional CR is not covered by the GSOEP sample. We are confident, 
however, that this approximation creates only minor noise in the data. 
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care by including a variable that measures the accumulated number of years that 
CGs have provided care, including also a squared term to capture possible non-
linear effects.29 The resulting descriptive statistics are outlined in the Appendix A 
Table A 1 to A 6.  
Methods 
Model I 
In model I, we use a sample of 33,994 individuals to measure the overall impact of 
providing care on SWB. In a first step, we use a standard fixed-effects (FE) model 
in the expectation that unobservables will depend on individuals’ emotional 
resilience and skills for coping with stress.30 We thus treat our dependent SWB 
variable as a cardinal and estimate an FE model of the following form: 
 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾Xit+µi + εit  for t=1,..,T & i=1,..,N   (1) 
 
where wit is the SWB of the CG, ci the time spent on care, and Xi a vector of other 
control variables. εi is the error term, and μi is a fixed constant variable capturing 
the unobserved heterogeneity in the error term.  
For a consistent and efficient application of the FE model, we need a metric 
dependent variable, but most well-being indicators are measured on an ordinal 
scale. Using a standard FE regression with an ordered dependent variable, however, 
might bias our results  (Baetschmann et al., 2011), a non-metric variable issue that 
                                                                
29  The counting of years begins with the 2001 wave when this question is asked for the first time. 
We cannot know, however, how long beforehand respondents were caregivers. We therefore test 
for this bias using an additional sample beginning with the 2002 wave and simply looking at 
those who were not CGs in 2001. 
30  A Hausman test supports the link between individuals and the unobserved effect and rejects the 
consistency of a random-effects model. 
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several panel models have been developed to address (Das & Van Soest, 1999; 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell & Frijters, 2004). We therefore test for a possible bias from the 
ordinal nature of our dependent variable using the fixed effect ordered logit model 
proposed by Baetschmann et al. (2011), a so-called “blow-up and cluster” estimator 
(BUC) whose consistency fares well in comparison to the FE model and other 
estimators for ordered dependent variables. Riedl and Geishecker (2011), for 
example, find that in Monte Carlo simulations, the BUC estimator outperforms all 
other models, especially for the GSOEP well-being variable, which contains 11 
categories.  
Specifically, the BUC estimator blows up the sample with K–1 copies of every 
observation and then dichotomizes them at different thresholds so that a conditional 
maximum likelihood logit can be estimated on the entire “blown-up” sample. 
Because some individual observations contribute to several terms in the log-
likelihood, standard errors are clustered at the individual level:  
   
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗ = 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖    (2) 
 
The estimation of the latent variable w*it is based on the independent variables and 
the two error terms (ui, eit). w*it is approximated by an ordered variable wit , which 
follows the rule: 
 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑘𝑘    𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘 < 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ < 𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘+1    (3) 
 
Here, the thresholds must strictly increase, running from –∞ for t1 to +∞ at tK+1. In 
addition, because the literature reports gender differences associated with the effect 
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of caregiving on SWB, we run separate regressions for men and women.  
Model II 
An important control variable in this context is CG age because, besides the 
possibility of different perceptions among different age groups in providing 
informal care, caring can be physically demanding. Assisting recipients with 
mobility and personal hygiene, particularly, requires physical strength, which is 
very likely to differ among age groups. Model I, however, provides no 
differentiated perspective of ageing effects because time-demeaning age with an FE 
model in a 10-year panel data set subtracts most of the age effect. With longitudinal 
data, on the other hand, three separate time effects can be differentiated that could 
influence perceptions of caring: cohort, age, and period effects.  
The first type, the cohort effect, refers to the influence of the conditions 
surrounding individuals born at the same time. For example, it is likely that, besides 
their actual age, those born before World War II experienced their environment 
differently at age 70 than will the baby-boomer generation at the same age. The age 
effect, in contrast, distinguishes the changing perceptions of people at different 
ages. For instance, 20-year-olds, being in the early stage of their lives, do not have 
the same values and experiences as 60-year-olds, a difference that we control for 
by using age and age-squared in the fixed-effects model. This effect of age on well-
being is demonstrated in several studies, which also show that it tends to be U-
shaped over the life course (Blanchflower & Oswald, 2008; Schilling, 2005). In 
Germany, this U-shaped relation between aging and well-being seems to apply 
particularly to those under 65, with a health-related decline in life satisfaction 
occurring at age 75+ that can be largely attributed to cohort effects (Gwozdz & 
Sousa-Poza, 2009; see also López Ulloa & Sousa-Poza, 2012). Although certain 
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dimensions of well-being decline, however, others may remain constant 
(Kunzmann et al., 2000).  
The third type of effect, the period effect, occurs only in panel data and is hard 
to separate from the cohort effect. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that being 60 in 
2001 differs from being 60 in 2010, not only because of the cohort or age effect but 
because general well-being can differ on account of macro events (e.g. recessions). 
We therefore control for period effects by using dummies for every wave. To 
account for all three effects, we run separate regressions for seven decades in which 
we also control for waves and age.  
Model III 
Our third model pays specific attention to Amirkhanyan and Wolf's (2006) 
contention that the impact on CG’s well-being is influenced more strongly by the 
presence of a CR in the household than by the fact of providing them with care (also 
see Bobinac et al, 2010). To test this assumption, we create three dummy variables: 
(i) CGs who provide care to CRs living in the same household, (ii) individuals living 
in the same household as the CR who do not provide any care, and (iii) CGs who 
provide care to CRs that do not live in the same household. The reference category 
is composed of individuals who neither provide care nor have a CR in their 
household, a differentiation that should provide further insights into the care effects 
not captured by our care variable. 
For this model, we run three estimations that build upon one another. The first, 
model IIIa, designed to identify the effect of the care arrangements and how the 
CGs’ SWB differs from that of those unaffected by caregiving, contains only the 
three dummy variables that separate the sample into four groups. Model IIIb then 
controls for the actual amount of care time provided in order to assess the pure 
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impact of the domestic situation. Model IIIc simply adds in a quadratic function of 
“care” using the control variables mentioned above.  
To gain additional insight into how the presence of a CR within a household 
effects the SWB of a household member, we observe caregiving households over a 
certain amount of time and compare the SWB of the members before and after a 
CR enters the household or a household member becomes a care recipient (see 
Clark et al., 2008a). More specifically, we identify the first year in which one of the 
household members is in need of care and then compare the impact on the SWB of 
a CR in the household to a baseline set 5 to 9 years before the event. We then add 
dummy variables for 3-4 years, 2 years, and 1 year before the event; the year of 
event; and 1–2 years, 3–4 years, 5–7 years, and 8 or more years of shared residency 
with the person in need of care. We run the FE regressions using 1,715 household 
members (8,111 observations) in an unbalanced panel in which the average person 
is observed for 4.7 years.  
Model IV 
Because perceptions of the care situation can be influenced by different 
relationships between CGs and CRs, we specifically analyze this relational aspect 
using the information reported by the head of household on the HQ about who 
provides care to whom. Although focusing specifically on CGs who provide care 
to a person living in the same household reduces the sample size to 1,452 
individuals (with 4,947 observations), it does allow us to identify the family 
structure. We then create layers of generations within the household and two 
different categories of care arrangements: “intragenerational care”, when people 
provide care within their own generation (e.g. spouses and siblings), and 
“intergenerational care”, when individuals provide care to a member of an older 
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generation (e.g., parents or grandparents)31. 
Model V 
The impact of caregiving on the provider’s well-being allows us to assign a 
monetary value to informal care time using the method developed by van den Berg 
and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2007), which calculates the amount of income needed to 
compensate an individual’s loss of well-being from an increase in informal care 
time. This method can only be applied if income has a positive effect and care time 
a negative effect, which generally appears to be the case (Boyce et al., 2010; 
Easterlin et al., 2010; Clark et al., 2008b). To impute the diminishing marginal 
returns on well-being, we use the logarithmic values of net household income. The 
logarithmic function of weekly care hours serves a similar function for care: one 
additional hour of care has different effects on SWB whether it doubles the absolute 
care time or increases it by only 1% (e.g., changing it from 100 to 101 hours a 
week). It can also reduce the effect of high values (over-reporting), which could 
occur in the data. 
For the valuation, we create a subsample of all those who provide at least one 
hour of informal care a week (N = 5,094), which we then regress on SWB while 
controlling for all important demographics. We thereby obtain coefficients with 
which to calculate the impact ratio of income and care time on SWB:  
𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
= − 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖�𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕�
      (4) 
This equation, in which w represents the overall SWB and t the time spent on 
informal care, shows how a change in care time can be compensated by a change 
                                                                
31  Because our focus is primarily on elderly CRs, we do not analyze the care provided by older 
CGs to younger CRs; most particularly, because providing care to a younger generation (as 
opposed to an older generation) can be expected to produce different perceptions, which would 
then have a different impact on CGs’ well-being (see Sen & Yurtsever, 2007). 
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in income y.  
As already mentioned, using a logarithmic function of care provides the change 
estimation in percent; however, because the percentage increase in one hour of care 
depends on the amount already provided, we need to look at different cut-off points. 
Specifically, we are interested in how a one-hour increase in care affects well-being 
and how much additional income can compensate the perceived loss. Here, as in 
van den Berg and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2007), we focus on the means of both the 
income and care time variables to derive an average monetary value. 
3.4 Results 
Model I 
Table 3.1 reports the results of the FE and BUC estimations for model I. The 
negative effect of informal care time on CGs’ SWB is significant for both estimators 
and all modifications of the model. In the FE model (Ia), the coefficient is equal to 
-.0039; that is, an increase of 80 hours per week has approximately the same effect 
on SWB as becoming unemployed. The coefficient of the BUC (Ic) is slightly larger 
but much in tune with the FE results in all estimations, and neither the significance 
nor the sign of any coefficient differs between the FE and BUC. Given this 
similarity, the remaining discussion reports the results of the FE model only, which 
are more straightforward to interpret. 
As Figure 3.1 shows, the accumulated years of providing care display a U-
shaped pattern, the average length of care provision within the 10 years of 
observation is 2.78, with the first years of being a CG seeming to impose the largest 
burden. Because of the squared term’s positive relation, the negative impact of 
caring is reduced to a minimum at about 3.5 years and has a nullified impact after 
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nearly 7 years32.  
 
Figure 3.1: Impact of Years of Caregiving on Subjective Well-being 
 
Figure 3.2 shows the results of a more flexible specification in which 10 dummy 
variables indicate how many years the CG has provided care within the observation 
time. Although the coefficients are negative in the first 3 years but positive in the 
last three, only two dummies are significant at the 5% level (years 3 and 9). The 
general picture is that wear-and-tear may dominate in the early years, but these 
negative effects are less pronounced in the long term. This finding lends support to 
the adaptation model, although larger samples would be needed to obtain 
conclusive evidence.  
   
                                                                
32  A comparison with a subsample from 2002–2010 using only CGs that began care provision in 















Figure 3.2: Dummies for Years of Being a Caregiver 
 
 
Residency does indeed appear to have an important impact on CGs well-being, 
which declines by 0.1758 (FE) if a CR lives in the CG’s home, a relatively strong 
effect, comparable to half the coefficient of the full employment variable. We 
observe few differences, however, for gender except that the long-term care 
coefficients are not significant in the male sample and men are less strongly affected 
by having a CR in the household. Care time itself shows only minor differences, 
with women suffering just .0002 more in their SWB if they provide one hour of 
care a week. However, when model Ib introduces the diminishing marginal impact 
of care time on CGs’ SWB, the data confirm our hypothesis: the care coefficients 
become more negative (ßModel Ia =-0.0039; ßModel Ib=-0.0085) but are diminished by 
the positive squared term (ß=.0004) of increasing care hours. Nevertheless, the U-
shaped pattern of the impact for long-term care remains, with negligible changes in 
the coefficients. Hence, overall, the results for model I suggest a negative impact of 















Table 3.2 reports the results for seven estimations of the 10 birth decades. The 
NTOTAL column shows the number of people born in that specific decade, while NCR 
gives the number of CGs in these cohorts. For 1900 to 1919 (not shown), we obtain 
no significant results, driven primarily by the low number of observations: fewer 
than 400 people in the sample were born before 1919 and few provide care (n = 36). 
For the 1920s cohort, although the number of CGs is still low (n = 282), the impact 
of hours of care has the highest negative size among all decades (ß = -0.0106). The 
coefficient of age is 0.5853 and only marginally diminished by the negative squared 
term (-0.004), possibly as a result of the oft-cited U-shaped pattern of SWB over 
the life course. The 1930s and 1940s cohorts show similar patterns. The residency 
dummy is highly significant and negative, with a magnitude of about -0.25, but the 
care coefficients decrease in younger cohorts, with the -0.0083 impact of one 
additional hour for a 1930 CG declining to -0.0051 for those from the following 
decade. The 1950s cohort shows an even lower impact of care time (-0.0034) and 
no significance for shared residency. The corresponding coefficients for CGs born 
after 1960 are not significant, possibly because the share of CGs is much smaller, 
meaning that younger people provide care less frequently, and shared residency is 
less common among younger cohorts, so obtaining empirical evidence among 
younger CGs may require a larger sample. Overall, however, the table does show a 
pattern for the link between age and caregiving, which, as already pointed out, is a 
physically demanding task that requires physical strength. Specifically, our analysis 
shows larger declines in SWB for older cohorts resulting from care provision to and 




Table 3.1: Caregivers Overall Well-being 
 Fixed-effects BUC 
 Model Ia Model Ib Model Ic 
 overall female male overall overall female male 
Hours of care weekly -.0039 *** -.0038 *** -.0035 *** -.0085 *** -.0045 *** -.0044 *** -.0040 * 
Hours of care weekly² -  -  -  .00004 *** -  -  -  
Time caring yearly -.0418 *** -.0584 *** -.0180  -.0245 ** -.0896 *** -.1164 *** -.0475  
Time caring yearly² .0060 *** .0077 *** .0034  .0042 *** .0129 *** .0160 *** .0078  
CR lives in the household -.1763 *** -.2247 *** -.1324 *** -.1543 *** -.2406 *** -.2618 *** -.2324 ** 
R²(pseudo) .1374  .1318  .1485  .1369  .0637    .0667  
Numbers of CG 5094  3055  2039  5094  5094  3055  2039  
Notes: Regressions include controls for age, household income, education, marital status, employment, health, children, and waves. Robust standard errors in  
parentheses. *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. 
 
Table 3.2: Cohort Decades for Caregivers 
Birth Care Age Age² CR in HH NTOTAL NCG 
1920-1929 -.0106 *** .5853 *** -.0040 *** -.0980  1785 282 
1930-1939 -.0083 *** .1201  -.0010 * -.2544 *** 3778 776 
1940-1949 -.0051 *** .0265  ,0002  -.2682 *** 4845 1124 
1950-1959 -.0034 ** -.0676  .0006  -.0889  5859 1288 
1960-1969 .0006  -.0202  -.0001  -.1216  6551 830 
1970-1979 -.0007  -.0466  .0006  -.1638  4728 382 
1980-1989 -.0044  -.2614 *** .0047 *** .0312  4916 343 
Notes: Regressions include controls for household income, education, marital status, employment, health, children, and waves.  




This model is designed to reveal the dynamics outlined by Amirkhanyan and Wolf 
(2006), who stress the shortcomings in many studies in which a comparison of CG 
to non-CG does not measure the pure impact of caring. Rather, they find more 
negative effects generated by the existence of a CR within the family than by care 
time. To account for this effect, we split the residency dummy into three separate 
dummies and report the results in Table 3.3. Model IIIa, which does not control for 
care time, shows the negative coefficients for all three dummy variables. The 
coefficient for those who provide care to a resident has the highest value (ß=-
0.3164), with a relatively large impact that corresponds to the effect of becoming 
unemployed. A comparison of the other two dummy variables confirms 
Amirkhanyan and Wolf's (2006) findings to some extent. Individuals with a CR 
living in the household suffer more in their well-being than those who provide care 
to a non-residential CR. 
Model IIIb integrates the care time variables into the estimation. Not only does 
the magnitude of the coefficient show minor differences with model Ib, but we 
observe changes in our three dummy variables compared to model IIIa. Both ßs for 
actual CG’s (co-residential and non-residential) become smaller, while the dummy 
for non-CGs remains relatively constant. The coefficients for CGs with shared 
accommodation decrease by more than 40% from -0.3164 to -0.1893 and for non-
shared CGs by as much as 60% (ßIIIa = -0.1015 to ßIIIb = -0.0373). These results 
suggest that approximately 16 hours of care by a CG assisting a CR outside the 
household has the same effect on SWB as having a CR in the household but not 
providing care time.  
Nevertheless, these differences between CGs and non-CGs in a household 
affected by informal care are hard to interpret once care time is controlled for. One 
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possible explanation is that the time spent on caring strengthens the relationship 
between CR and CG, which makes the former feel more responsible and therefore 
more affected by the care situation of a close relative. Yet, even after care is 
controlled for in model IIIb, the non-resident CG still shows a negative ß, albeit 
with a low level of significance (10%), compared to non-CGs without a CR in their 
household. In fact, the coefficient is nearly the same size as the difference between 
CGs and non-CGs in a caring household, which could suggest that caring simply 
has a negative impact that is not captured by our care variable. At about .03, this 
effect is quite small and even becomes insignificant (for non-resident CGs) once 
we add in controls for the years of CG experience in model IIIc. 
The additional baseline method also shows an overall negative impact of 
residency even after care time is controlled for (see figure 3.3): compared to the 
baseline, even one year before a CR is present in the household, there is a negative 
impact on the household member. This finding might be explained by some type of 
foreshadowing, by relatives already being in a bad state of health. This explanation 
is partly supported by our analysis of the time that household members spend on 
caring: whereas at the baseline, the subsample of 1,715 CGs provides an average of 
0.4 hours of care weekly, one year before the event, this average care time rises to 
over 2 hours, and after the event, the mean is always above 13 hours a week. 
In the first year with a CR in the household, the coefficient shows a high 
negative value (ß=-0.4660), and the size of the coefficients increases over the next 
7 years.  As we are using an unbalanced panel, the lack of significance in the 8+ 
year dummy is most probably related to the reduced sample size (N = 397). 
Nevertheless, this analysis indicates that the residency of a CR has a strong and 
persistent effect on the SWB of a household member, which suggests that, as no 
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adaptation seems to be taking place, wear-and-tear tends to dominate.  
 
Level of significance:  = 10%,  = 5%,  = 1% 




Table 3.4 shows the different effects of care once the sample is split into inter- 
and intragenerational CGs. Not only is the coefficient for intergenerational care 
three times larger than that for intragenerational care, but the intergenerational CGs 
are significantly younger (Mageinter = 51) than their intragenerational counterparts 
(Mageintra= 66). Although this difference may be explainable by the higher 
opportunity costs of caring among the young (and often working) CGs, it might 
equally be associated with the oft-cited family conflicts that arise from 










Table 3.4: Caregivers’ Overall Well-being 
 
 
 Model IIIa Model IIIb Model IIIc 
Hours of care weekly -  -.0079 *** -.0080 *** 
Hours of care weekly² -  .00004 *** .00004 *** 
Time caring yearly -  -  -.0113  
Time caring yearly² -  -  .0029  
CG provides care to a resident -. 3164 *** -.1893 *** -.1818 *** 
CG provides care to a non-resident -. 1007 *** -.0373 * -.0308  
CG does not provide care to a needy resident  -. 1630 *** -.1597 *** -.1585 *** 
R² . 1394      .1382  1366    
Notes: Regressions include controls for age, household income, education, marital status, employment, health, children, and waves.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. 
 
 Intergenerational care Intragenerational care  
 overall female male overall female male 
Hours of care weekly -.0114 *** -.0115 *** -.0112 ** -.0035 ** -.0066 *** .0024  
Time caring yearly .0230  .0261  .0307  .0317  .1624    -.2316  
Time caring yearly² .0012  .0046  .0023  .0003  .00002  .0039  
Observations 385  210  175  766  422  344  
R² .1526  .1568  .1218  .0443  .0025  .0058  
Notes: Regressions include controls for age, household income, education, marital status, employment, health, children, and waves.  




As regards explained variance, whereas using the same model explains 
approximately 15% of the variance for intergenerational care, for the 
intragenerational subsample, it explains less than 5%. This notable difference 
suggests that older CGs may be affected by something other than care and the 
control variables we select. In addition, the comparison between female and male 
CGs reveals certain differences in the family structure: in intergenerational care 
arrangements, both genders are more or less equally burdened by care, whereas for 
intragenerational CGs, we obtain significant results only for women. In neither 
estimation do we obtain any results related to the long-term effect, probably because 
of the small sample size.  
Model V 
The results of the monetary valuation using the van den Berg and Ferrer-i-Carbonell 
(2007) method are given in Table 3.5. Here, based on the coefficients, we estimate 
the increase in income needed to compensate CGs for one additional hour of care 
with particular attention to the values for the mean of weekly care time and 
household net income. Because the 5,094 CGs in the sample provide 14.5 hours of 
care on average, we define the cut-off point at 14 to 15 hours, which implies a 7% 
increase in the time spent caring. The mean income of CG households is €2,997 a 
month, a little lower than the average of the whole sample.  








Additional hour of informal care Change FE BUC 
4-5 25% 27.60 € 26.66 € 
9-10 11% 12.27 € 11.85 € 
14-15 7% 7.89 € 7.62 € 
19-20 5% 5.81 € 5.61 € 
29-30 3% 3.81 € 3.68 € 
39-40 2% 2.83 € 2.73 € 
167-168 0.6% 0.66 € 0.64 € 




The bold numbers show how much money would be needed to compensate an 
average CG with an average income for one more hour of care, which is valued 
within the range of €7.62 to €7.89.  
These results are in line with those of van den Berg and Ferrer-i-Carbonell 
(2007), who identify a monetary value of one additional hour (taken at the average) 
of between €7.21 and €9.06 for a sample of Dutch CGs in the 2000s. It is interesting 
to compare this value with the minimum hourly wages for care nurses, namely 
€7.50 for Eastern and €8.50 for Western Germany. A further comparison can be 
made with the benefits from the German LTCI, in which CRs are entitled to 
financial compensation if care is provided by a relative. As of 2012, a CR who 
needs 15 hours of care per week would be classified as care level 1 and be entitled 
to €235 a month33. If this compensation were paid to the informal CG, then, 
according to our calculations, the hourly compensation of approximately €3.62 
would not be enough to hold the CG’s well-being constant. 
3.5 Conclusions 
Despite the growing importance of informal care in Germany, few studies address 
the effects of such care on the caregivers themselves, and research that does exist 
for other countries is hampered by methodological problems, including reliance on 
often small and unrepresentative cross-sectional analyses. This paper therefore aims 
to provide new evidence for Germany on the effect care provision has on CGs’ 
SWB while striving to overcome some of these methodological problems by 
exploiting the representative and longitudinal nature of the German Socio-
Economic Panel. Our results contribute useful new evidence to the extant literature 
and confirm previous findings. 
                                                                




First, and in line with much previous research, we observe a negative correlation 
between hours of care and CG’s SWB (Schulz et al., 1995; Chappell & Reid, 2002; 
Pinquart & Sörensen, 2003). This effect is relatively large and comparable to 
becoming unemployed. Second, regarding long-term care, we find a pattern that 
cannot simply be attributed to one of the two existing theories, adaptation and wear-
and-tear. Most particularly, by allowing the possibility of a non-linear relation 
between long-term care and SWB, we find some evidence for a U-shaped pattern: 
in the first years, care seems to decrease SWB, reaching a minimum at about year 
3. However, although this observation is in line with the wear-and-tear model, we 
also observe an attenuating effect that supports the adaptation model: that is, SWB 
increases with each additional year of care provision. Hence, our evidence suggests 
that these two models need not be mutually exclusive. Rather, becoming a CG can 
be a slowly evolving process in which adaptation to the new role of CG is likely to 
take time. Changes in working time or professional care support, especially, need 
time to be organized and finally implemented. 
Third, we show that this negative effect depends on birth cohorts, with negative 
effects being nearly exclusively observed for cohorts born between 1920 and 1959. 
This negative impact of care hours, however, also increases with higher age, an 
effect that could be related to the lower physical capability of older CGs. At the 
same time, older CGs also seem to be the most burdened by the presence of a CR 
in the household, which could be related to the additional loss of an active and 
mutually valuable partnership. Yet we find no evidence that this higher impact of 
caring can be explained by the family structure of the care arrangement; for 
example, by the prevalence of intragenerational care among older CGs.  




residency. In households that provide informal care over time, we observe no 
patterns of coping but rather see households with a CR as worse off over the long 
term compared to non-CG families. Although this observation adds some support 
to the wear-and-tear theory in terms of the capacity to adapt to domestic care 
arrangements, further research is needed to distinguish the effects of close distance 
to a suffering family member from a possible increase in housework that might 
burden the caregiving family. 
Finally, to make our findings more tangible and comparable to the existing 
formal care reference values, we use the negative effect of caring to determine the 
additional hourly income needed in order to compensate CGs for one additional 
hour of care. In our sample, we identify a value between €7.62 and €7.89 per hour 
on average, which appears consistent with the results obtained in other countries. 
Hence, although the politically enforced priority that LTCI benefits be used to 
maintain a domestic care arrangement might be a less expensive and even a socially 
more desirable form of care, such informal care is likely to take place at the expense 
of CG’s SWB. In fact, our valuation suggests that higher monetary benefits are 
needed if the negative effects of caring are to be compensated, especially given that 
the market for private care insurance is still surprisingly small (Meier, 1999; Brown 
& Finkelstein, 2007). With such negative outcomes for partners and offspring in 
cases of care dependency, it may be advisable to make these increasing risks of 





4 Heterogeneous Selection in the Market for Private 






This paper analyzes the German market for supplemental dental insurance 
(SuppDI) to identify individual selection behavior. The rather limited underwriting 
by German private health insurers makes the SuppDI market especially prone to 
selection effects, which can lead to inefficient insurance coverage. Although our 
OLS does not identify a significant correlation between SuppDI coverage and risk 
for acute treatments, we conjecture that this outcome may result from sample 
heterogeneity when adverse and advantageous selection occur simultaneously and 
offset each other. We therefore use an IV method to confirm the existence of 
advantageous selection in a distinct subsample. We find that individuals who 
purchase SuppDI because of high insurance affinity have significantly lower risk in 
terms of dental treatment. Our results thus suggest that even in the absence of a 
positive correlation between risk and insurance coverage, the German SuppDI 




                                                                
34  This paper is joint work with Jörg Schiller and Christopher Schreckenberger both from the 
University of Hohenheim. The candidate’s contribution was mainly focused on the empirical 
work and the idea behind the econometric approach. The paper was presented to several 
international audiences (e.g., EGRIE annual meeting 2014) and submitted to the Journal of 





As health care expenditures have risen, coverage by public health care systems like 
the German statutory health insurance (SHI) has been incrementally reduced (Simon, 
2013). Therefore, markets for supplemental health insurance (SuppHI) that enables 
individuals to close these widening coverage gaps have been and are likely to 
continue growing in many OECD countries (OECD, 2004; Paolucci et al., 2007; 
Grabka, 2014). Within such a context, increasing copayments or benefit exclusions 
in public health care systems not only reduce the financial burden on public insurance 
schemes but can also strengthen personal responsibility for health and raise individual 
cost consciousness (OECD, 2004; Müller & Böhm, 2009). Individuals are also more 
able to voluntarily choose their preferred insurance coverage. When the insurance 
market suffers from information asymmetry, however, shifting coverage to voluntary 
private health insurance carries a risk of inefficiency.  That is, if insurers are not able, 
or not allowed, to fully adjust premiums for individual risk type, selection effects lead 
to nonoptimal insurance coverage of the population. 
To improve understanding of selection within voluntary private health insurance, 
this paper analyzes information asymmetry in the market for private supplemental 
dental insurance (SuppDI) in Germany, a particularly appropriate context given that 
the rather limited underwriting by German private health insurers  makes the SuppDI 
market particularly prone to selection effects. In particular, it tests a basic prediction 
of the standard adverse selection model (i.e., Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1976), the 
existence of a positive correlation between insurance coverage and individual risk 
once all the policyholder characteristics used by insurers for pricing are controlled 
for (Cohen & Siegelman, 2010). Despite empirical support for this positive 




Goddeeris, 1991; Godfried et al., 2001), several recent studies find a nonsignificant 
or even negative relation (e.g., Fang et al., 2008; Schmitz, 2011). This negative 
association, often referred to as advantageous selection, can be explained by 
multidimensional private information; that is, individual possession of private 
information about characteristics correlated with both higher insurance coverage and 
lower risk. De Meza and Webb (2001) suggest in their theoretical model that highly 
risk averse individuals are more likely to purchase insurance coverage and invest 
more in precaution, thereby lowering risk.  
The absence of a coverage-risk correlation, however, which is also observed in 
our analysis despite the limited underwriting of German health insurers, could be 
explained by two alternatives: either the market does not suffer from empirically 
important information asymmetry, which suggests an efficient solution, or the 
adverse and advantageous selection offset each other in the aggregate, which may 
lead to an inefficient market outcome (Finkelstein & McGarry, 2006). Because both 
these explanations have different welfare implications, it is important to investigate 
the underlying cause of this nonsignificant correlation. Hence, we apply an 
instrumental variable (IV) approach that allows us to disentangle different subgroups 
within a heterogeneous sample. By instrumenting SuppDI, we identify the presence 
of information asymmetry in the German SuppDI market that is not evident when the 
coverage-risk correlation is estimated using standard regression.  
By identifying heterogeneous selection behavior in the insurance market using a 
method different to that of previous studies (e.g. Fang et al., 2008; Finkelstein & 
McGarry, 2006, Lange et al., 2015), we make a valuable contribution to the literature. 
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to use an IV approach to disentangle 




this approach on the assumption that, in line with de Meza and Webb (2001), 
individuals having many supplemental insurances are more likely to exert effort for 
prevention and purchase SuppDI because of an inner need for security. Thus, our IV 
results complement the scarce and mixed evidence on risk preferences as a potential 
source of advantageous selection. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of 
the German health insurance system with a special focus on SuppDI. Section 3 then 
summarizes the basic theoretical effects of information asymmetry in insurance 
markets and reviews the most relevant empirical studies on such asymmetry as it 
pertains to voluntary private health insurance. Section 4 describes the data and 
empirical model, and Section 5 reports the results of both the main analysis and 
several robustness checks. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
4.2 Institutional Background and Private Supplemental Dental 
Insurance in Germany 
In Germany, nearly 90% of the population is covered by SHI, while about 10% has 
substitutive private health insurance (PHI). SHI members contribute in the form of a 
payroll tax with a uniform rate since 2009. Dependent workers whose income is 
below the so-called compulsory threshold cannot opt out of SHI,35 but employees 
with an income above the threshold, as well as civil servants and the self-employed, 
can opt for PHI, which substitutes for SHI entirely. PHI premiums are generally risk 
adjusted based on age and health status at the date of contract signing, with benefits 
subject to individual contractual agreement between the health insurer and the 
insured. SHI, in contrast, has a highly uniform standard benefit package for all funds 
(Simon, 2013), one that is quite comprehensive compared to those in other 
                                                                
35  In the empirical analysis, we use data from 2011 when the threshold for compulsory health 




industrialized countries (Beske et al., 2005). Nevertheless, because German health 
care expenditure as a proportion of GDP is only exceeded by that of the United States 
and a few other countries (OECD, 2013), out-of-pocket expenses from copayments 
and standard benefit exclusions have recently been increasing in an attempt to lower 
this share (Müller & Böhm, 2009; Farbmacher & Winter, 2013).  
Individuals enrolled in SHI are however permitted to buy supplemental private 
coverage directly from private health insurers (rather than through their employers), 
which is guaranteed renewable (Pauly et al., 1995). Generally, SuppHI offers two 
types of benefits: entitlement to higher quality treatment (e.g., private hospital rooms 
or treatment by a chief physician) and reduced financial risk associated with services 
not or only partly covered by SHI.  In case of SuppDI, the main purpose is to reduce 
or close the coverage gaps in the SHI benefit package.36 According to data from the 
GSOEP, a representative survey for the German population, the proportion of SHI 
enrollees having at least one supplemental insurance increased from 9.6% in 2000 to 
21.6% in 2012 (see Figure 4.1), meaning that more than one out of five SHI members 
have some type of additional health insurance coverage (Grabka, 2014).  
 
 
                                                                






Figure 4.1: Share of SHI Enrollees with SuppHI, 2000–2012 
 
Among the various supplemental insurances available to SHI enrollees, SuppDI 
is the most prevalent and has the highest recent growth rate, probably because of the 
considerable cuts in SHI dental benefits over the past 20 years (Simon, 2013). In 
particular, these benefits have been subject to two major reforms. The first, in 1997, 
excluded dental prostheses from the standard benefit package for a subgroup of 
insured, although this exclusion was reversed only two years later for political 
reasons.37 The second was a 2004 reform that changed the 35%–50% coinsurance 
rate for dental prostheses to diagnosis-based fixed benefits covering 50%38 of the cost 
of standard treatment for all but low-income SHI enrollees, who are eligible to receive 
                                                                
37  This reform, which was based on the law for contribution reduction (Beitragsentlastungsgesetz), 
only applied to those born after 1978. The fixed benefits for dental prostheses were introduced 
as part of the laws for SHI reorganization (GKV-Neuordnungsgesetze) but were replaced in 1999 
by the principle of benefits in kind for dental prostheses. 
38  By law, the fixed benefits can rise by 20% (30%) if there is evidence that the insured performs 
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the full cost of standard treatment.39 Dental prostheses costs that exceed the fixed 
benefits, however, must be paid out of pocket (Klingenberger & Micheelis, 2005), 
subjecting SHI enrollees to an increased financial risk associated with dental care 
(Simon, 2013). In response, SHI enrollees have substantially stepped up their demand 
for SuppDI after the reform (Figure 4.1). Additionally, some funds started 
cooperating with private health insurers to offer SuppHI to their insured since 2005, 
possibly stimulating the demand for SuppDI policies (Grabka, 2014). According to 
the Association of German Private Healthcare Insurers (2006, 2013), the number of 
such policies rose nearly 75% between 2005 and 2012 to over 13 million, with 16.6% 
of statutorily insured individuals having a SuppDI in 2012 (see Figure 4.1). Hence, 
the proportion of SHI enrollees with SuppDI coverage tripled between 2004 and 
2012.  
The premiums for SuppDIs are generally risk adjusted based on individual age at 
date of contract signing40 and sometimes based on a few questions about dental health 
for risk classification. Specifically, insurers may ask applicants about past dental 
prostheses or advised dental or orthodontic treatment and can also reject them based 
on risk-related responses. Nevertheless, the ex-ante premium differentiation for 
SuppDI is limited, which may lead to selection effects from information asymmetry. 
In addition, there is no consideration of past premium payment history, meaning that 
the information asymmetry from lack of ex-ante premium differentiation preserves 
over time. 
  
                                                                
39  According to Barmer GEK, in 2012, about 9% of SHI enrollees received diagnosis-based fixed 
benefits covering 100% of the cost of standard treatment (Rädel et al., 2014). 
40  Conditional on the chosen coverage, the premium for an individual signing a SuppDI contract at 




4.3 Theoretical Effects of Information Asymmetry in Insurance 
Markets 
In the standard insurance model with adverse selection (Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1976), 
individual private information is one-dimensional because the individuals differ only 
with respect to policyholder risk. In this setting, insurers can only offer separating 
contracts, which induce self-selection. Hence, in equilibrium, high-risk individuals 
choose policies with full (more) coverage at higher unitary premiums, whereas low-
risk individuals choose policies with partial (less) coverage at lower unitary 
premiums. According to this model, in the context of mandatorily insured SHI 
enrollees, only high-risk individuals purchase SuppDI, meaning that low-risk 
individuals are rationed with respect to the first-best market outcome. The result is an 
inefficient market outcome in the separating equilibrium.  
The basic empirical prediction of adverse selection models is that in market 
equilibrium, the amount of insurance coverage is positively correlated with the risk 
of loss (Chiappori et al., 2006). In testing this assumption, however, it is very 
important to control for all relevant characteristics used by insurers for risk-based rate 
setting (Cohen & Siegelman, 2010) so that the impact of residual private information 
can be assessed (Finkelstein & McGarry, 2006). Nevertheless, once all known 
observables are controlled for, a positive correlation between coverage and risk is 
only a necessary and not a sufficient condition for the presence of adverse selection, 
as such a positive correlation may also arise from moral hazard. In the latter case, 
individuals with higher coverage take fewer preventive measures, which in turn leads 
to a higher probability of loss (ex-ante moral hazard), or demand more health services 
following illness when such demand is not perfectly inelastic (ex-post moral hazard) 




The absence of such a positive correlation can be explained either by negligible 
information asymmetries or, more important, by the introduction of unobservable risk 
preference heterogeneity into the model. Hemenway (1990), who first applied the 
term “propitious selection” to this reversal of the standard adverse selection 
prediction, suggests that highly risk-averse individuals are more likely to buy 
insurance coverage and invest more in prevention so as to reduce their risk of loss. 
This mechanism can produce an advantageous selection leading to a negative 
correlation between actual risk and risk aversion. In line with this argument, de Meza 
and Webb (2001) develop a theoretical model that explicitly allows for 
multidimensional private information and assumes that individuals differ not only 
with respect to risk type but also to risk preferences. Based on this assumption, the 
authors show the existence of equilibria with advantageous selection in competitive 
insurance markets, which is crucially dependent on private information about 
characteristics that are positively correlated with insurance coverage and negatively 
correlated with individual risk. These characteristics, therefore, must not be used in 
insurers’ premium calculations (Finkelstein & McGarry, 2006).  
The evidence for such ex-ante hidden information in private SuppHI markets, 
however, is mixed. In an analysis somewhat similar to ours, Godfried et al. (2001) 
identify adverse selection among the effects of dental service exclusion from 
compulsory health insurance on the demand for SuppDI in the Netherlands. In doing 
so, they show that individuals with poorer dental health or more frequent past dentist 
visits (high risk) are more likely to purchase SuppDI than individuals with better 
dental health or fewer past visits (low risk). In contrast, Schmitz (2011), using 
GSOEP data, reports weak evidence for advantageous selection in the German 




aversion are more likely to purchase this insurance but have fewer hospital stays 
within a 6-year post-purchase period than males with lower risk aversion. In another 
study, Augurzky and Tauchmann (2011) find no significant effect of excluding and 
then re-including dental prostheses in SHI coverage on SuppDI demand in Germany. 
They conclude that either individuals fail to make informed choices about the amount 
of dental insurance coverage needed or individual preferences are not subject to 
heterogeneity. However, their analysis, unlike ours, does not focus on information 
asymmetry. 
Several recent studies do find evidence for the importance of multidimensional 
private information in different insurance markets (Cohen & Siegelman, 2010; Einav 
& Finkelstein, 2011). For example, Finkelstein and McGarry (2006), in a closely 
related analysis of the U.S. long-term care insurance (LTCI) market, show that once 
insurer assessment of policyholder risk type is controlled for, individuals with a 
higher subjective expectation of entering a nursing home are more likely to buy LTCI 
coverage. On the other hand, they find no evidence from the same data of a positive 
correlation between LTCI coverage and admission to a nursing home. They explain 
this puzzle by suggesting that risk-based (adverse) selection is offset by preference-
based (advantageous) selection in the aggregate. Using two separate regressions 
based on the approach proposed by Chiappori and Salanié (2000), they show that 
wealthier and more cautious individuals are more likely to hold an LTCI policy but 
less likely to enter a nursing home. They thus conclude that an insurance market may 
suffer from inefficiencies due to information asymmetry even in the absence of a 
positive correlation between insurance coverage and risk occurrence. 
Combining the ideas of Hemenway (1990) with the theoretical model of de Meza 




advantageous selection in voluntary health insurance markets. However, the 
empirical evidence on the role of risk preferences in SuppHI demand remains scarce 
and ambiguous (Kiil, 2012). Moreover, evidence for risk aversion as a significant 
determinant of insurance coverage is not a sufficient condition for risk aversion as a 
source of advantageous selection. For example, Fang et al. (2008) find evidence for 
advantageous selection in the U.S. market for Medigap (i.e. a supplement for 
Medicare). Furthermore, they add some covariates into a regression of Medigap 
coverage on expected health care expenditure and pricing variables to identify the 
sources of advantageous selection.41 Adding only proxies for risk preferences into 
this regression barely changes the coefficient on health care expenditure risk even 
though risk tolerance significantly decreases the purchase of Medigap. One possible 
explanation is that risk tolerance is not necessarily linked to bad health, meaning that 
risk preferences are not a source of advantageous selection. This is in line with Cutler 
et al. (2008) who find no systematic relationship between risky behavior and expected 
claims for Medigap and acute health insurance. Instead, Fang et al. (2008) identify 
cognitive ability as an important selection source in the Medigap market. 
Buchmueller et al. (2013), using a similar approach with risk as the dependent 
variable,42 find a significantly negative correlation between having a duplicate 
private health insurance in Australia and the number of nights spent in hospital (risk) 
indicating advantageous selection in this market. Furthermore, they show that risk 
preferences turn the relation between insurance coverage and risk from negatively 
                                                                
41  In their study, variables that are correlated positively with coverage but negatively with risk 
change the magnitude of the risk coefficient and can thus be considered sources of advantageous 
selection. 
42  In contrast to Fang et al. (2008), Buchmueller et al. (2013), in studying advantageous selection 
sources, use a proxy for risk as the dependent variable and insurance coverage as the independent 
variable. However, their strategy of adding covariates into the regression to identify sources is 




significant to insignificant when proxies for risk preferences are added into the 
regression. They conclude, along with their additional finding that individuals with 
private health insurance are more likely to buy other types of insurance (e.g., life 
insurance), that risk aversion essentially influences the demand for private health 
insurance and modestly contributes to the observed advantageous selection in this 
market. 
4.4 Data and Methodology 
Our analysis is based on the Healthcare Monitor,43 a representative survey of a cross-
section of the German population administered since 2001 by the Bertelsmann 
Foundation.44 Comprising 21 biannual waves, this survey includes such detailed 
health information as general health status, health insurance coverage, different types 
of SuppHI coverage (including SuppDI), socioeconomic characteristics, number of 
physician visits, and relationship between patients and physicians. For the present 
analysis, we rely exclusively on wave 19 (from 2011) because it contains very 
detailed information about dental status and dentist visits. For this wave, a total of 
2,200 individuals aged 18 to 79 were contacted by mail, of whom over 80% 
responded, producing a sample of 1,781 individuals (GfK Health Care, 2011).  
Table 4.1 lists the characteristics of all individuals by insurance status. According 
to column 1, which shows the share of PHI enrollees (n = 285), these individuals tend 
to be older, have higher incomes, and be more predominantly male than SHI enrollees 
(column 2). These findings are in line with the fact that switching from SHI to PHI 
requires an income above the compulsory threshold, which is far above the German 
average income. With regard to dental health, however, we observe no major 
                                                                
43  The Gesundheitsmonitor. 
44  Since 2011, the statutory health insurance fund Barmer GEK has been cooperating with the 




differences between the two groups. Given our focus on selection in the SuppDI 
market, however, we are particularly interested in differences between individuals 
with and without a SuppDI policy. Since the additional coverage offered by SuppDI 
is already included in most PHI plans, we exclude individuals with PHI and 
concentrate only on individuals with SHI, which reduces the final sample to 1,496. 
The comparison between SHI with (3) and without (4) SuppDI shows that, in line 
with most findings in the literature (e.g., Kiil, 2012), SuppDI enrollees are more likely 
to be married and have a higher income. 
More important in our context, the comparison reveals that policyholders have 
significantly more dental implants and fillings, as well as more acute dental pain, and 
show generally worse dental health, with a lower share of individuals without any 
dental issues. Individuals with SuppDI also go to the dentist more often than the 
noninsured comparison group, which would suggest adverse selection were it not that 
the overall number of dentist visits also includes check-ups and aesthetic procedures. 
In fact, Table 4.1 confirms this latter observation: SuppDI policyholders tend to have 






Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics by Insurance 
 PHI SHI SHI 
 (1) (2) (3)   SuppDI    (4) 
 All All Yes No 
Male 0.687 0.454 0.429 0.464 
Age 54.567 49.495 50.324 49.153 
Married 0.690 0.576 0.637 0.550*** 
Income 3.690 2.782 2.993 2.695*** 
A-level 0.657 0.462 0.446 0.468 
Employment     
    Full time 0.422 0.389 0.407 0.381 
    Part time 0.052 0.123 0.115 0.127 
    Hourly 0.022 0.059 0.061 0.059 
    Unemployed 0.455 0.358 0.373 0.352 
    Job training 0.049 0.071 0.044 0.082** 
Household size 2.291 2.315 2.341 2.304 
Self-rated health 3.201 3.135 3.130 3.137 
Never a smoker 0.545 0.561 0.532 0.572 
BMI 26.500 26.428 26.543 26.381 
Activity 4.134 3.940 4.034 3.901 
Diet     
    Fruits 3.179 3.218 3.267 3.198 
    Vegetables 3.157 3.075 3.137 3.050** 
    Fast food 1.825 1.822 1.824 1.822 
    Sweets 2.347 2.411 2.419 2.408 
Dentist visits per year 1.817 1.761 2.049 1.641*** 
Number of other SuppHIs 1.160 0.506 1.179 0.228*** 
Usual preventive dentist visits per year    
    Seldom/only in pain 0.108 0.054 0.022 0.068*** 
    Once in 2 years 0.082 0.032 0.020 0.036 
    Once  0.354 0.375 0.353 0.384 
    Twice  0.384 0.490 0.551 0.464*** 
    Three times or more 0.071 0.049 0.054 0.048 
Dental issues     
    Periodontitis 0.146 0.178 0.159 0.185 
    Filling 0.623 0.674 0.728 0.651*** 
    Prosthesis 0.384 0.419 0.441 0.409 
    Implant  0.198 0.105 0.127 0.096* 
    Braces 0.022 0.021 0.017 0.022 
    Grind teeth 0.056 0.065 0.076 0.060 
    Missing teeth 0.078 0.095 0.098 0.093 
    Toothache 0.011 0.015 0.025 0.011* 
    Chewing/jaw 0.007 0.022 0.025 0.021 
    Caries 0.071 0.074 0.061 0.079 
    No issues 0.123 0.115 0.088 0.126** 
Observations 285 1,496 429 1,067 
Notes: Sample size can vary slightly within each variable. Income is measured in €1,000 intervals from < €1,000 up 
to > €5,000 monthly net household income. Self-rated health: bad = 1 to excellent = 5. Activity: never = 1 to daily 
= 6. Diet: never/seldom = 1 to daily = 4. The level of significance for the statistical differences in a two-sided t-test 






To estimate the relation between SuppDI coverage and risk, we must find an 
appropriate measure for the financial risk associated with dental treatments. Because 
the Health Monitor data are cross-sectional only and based on patient surveys, they 
include no information on specific type of dental care or resulting expenditure for 
dental treatments, meaning that we cannot fully measure individual risk. Rather, we 
proxy risk by the number of dentist visits. Simply comparing the numbers for SuppDI 
enrollees and non-enrollees, however, is inadequate for risk assessment because the 
former may simply be more likely to have annual check-ups. Hence, to improve our 
dependent variable’s risk measuring ability, we adjust our model in two ways: 
transforming the count variable to disentangle acute treatment visits from preventive 
check-ups and adding in more covariates to further reduce the nonacute treatment 
bias.  
As regards the first adjustment, Figure 4.2 shows the distribution of dentist visits 
for the whole sample of individuals with SHI. As is evident, many individuals go to 
the dentist only once or twice a year, which indicates actual treatment or simply 
following dentist recommendations of two dental check-ups per year.45 We thus 
transform the dependent variable DentVisits into a dummy equal to 1 if an individual 
went to the dentist more than twice in the previous year, and 0 otherwise. This 
transformation of the count variable, also used by Godfried et al. (2001), should 
prevent incorrect measurement of preventive dentist visits as a proxy for risk. 
Because German insurers only cover two annual check-ups, we assume that three or 
more dentist visits a year clearly point to acute treatment. 
                                                                
45  SHI members have a financial incentive to go for regular dental check-ups because if they do so 





Figure 4.2: Number of Dentist Visits for all Individuals with SHI 
 
The other covariates introduced into the model to further reduce the nonacute 
treatment bias are based on responses to individual survey items. One assesses the 
usual number of annual dentist visits for patients without any major dental issues.46 
We add dummies for this variable into the controls represented by vector C with the 
aim of capturing overly cautious individuals (i.e., those getting more than the 
recommended two annual check-ups). C also includes individuals’ fear of the dentist, 




                                                                
46  Possible answers are three or more times a year,” “about twice a year,” “about once a year,” 
“about once in two years,” or “seldom, only in pain.” 




Drawing on the above, we estimate the relation between SuppDI coverage and 
risk by specifying the following linear probability model48 (LPM): 
 
 P(DentVisits=1|DIns, X, C) = α0 + α1DIns + α2X + α3C   (1) 
 
Here, the coefficient of interest, DIns, indicates insurance coverage (i.e., whether an 
individual has SuppDI (DIns=1) or not (DIns=0)), and X represents a vector of 
covariates to control for the risk classification in SuppDI policies. In line with the 
pricing of all German health insurers offering SuppDI, we use the insured’s age49 but 
also include whether or not the individual has dental prostheses or dental implants to 
reflect the more thorough risk classification used by some insurance companies. All 
these variables are included in nonparametric form, and results are robust against 
interaction between all characteristics. Because of space constraints, however, in 
Table 4.2, we use only the simplified version of the risk classification without 
interaction terms. It should also be noted that although insurers are allowed to reject 
applicants whose estimated risk is too high, the data do not allow us to control for 
rejected applications. Given that only a few insurance companies have explicit 
rejection rules (e.g., no contract finalization when tooth loss is greater than three), we 
expect this bias to be small. Moreover, rejections by German private health insurers 
because of bad dental health are rare (Finanztest, 2014). 
                                                                
48  Because the dependent variable is dichotomous, we also estimate a probit model whose results 
are given in Table 4.2.  
49  As the data are only cross-sectional, we cannot include characteristics related to time of contract 
finalization. As a proxy, we use current information from the survey. In fact, age at contract entry 
is decisive for risk classification; however, since the survey does not report this datum, we 
control for the age of the insured at time of survey. We assume this bias to be relatively small 




Assuming that model (1) adequately measures risk, three observations are 
possible in the interdependence between SuppDI coverage and dentist visits, two 
related to a positive correlation of α1 > 0 in (1) and one to a negative link (α1 < 0). 
The first, in line with classical adverse selection, is that α1 > 0 results from residual 
ex-ante private information about the expected use of dental services. Under this 
condition, individuals with private information about their high risk type would be 
more likely to buy the supplemental coverage. The second possibility is that 
individuals with SuppDI coverage take fewer precautions (e.g., everyday dental care) 
and are thus either at higher risk (ex-ante moral hazard) or demand more dental 
services because of lower marginal costs (ex-post moral hazard). A negative link (α1 
< 0), in contrast, would indicate advantageous selection in the German SuppDI 
market, possibly caused by a higher likelihood that cautious individuals will purchase 
SuppDI and engage in more preventative behaviors, leading to fewer dentist visits for 
acute treatments. Nevertheless, it should also be noted that, despite doubts about a 
strong impact of moral hazard in the field of dentistry, we cannot reject a possible 
bias in the analysis of selection behavior. Because moral hazard can only explain an 
upward bias that overestimates possible adverse selection, it brings into question the 
interpretation of a positive correlation. In the case of a negative correlation, on the 
other hand, moral hazard would cause the model to underestimate the magnitude of 
the coefficient. Hence, α1 < 0 indicates advantageous selection irrespective of the 
presence of moral hazard.  
When equation (1) is estimated by a simple OLS regression, the coefficient α1 
shows the aggregate relation of all these possibly overlapping effects. A significant 
correlation thus only refers to the dominant population. If the sample is 




others bring about advantageous selection by having characteristics that are positively 
correlated with buying SuppDI but negatively correlated with dentist visits for acute 
treatments. If selection in the sample is heterogeneous, these effects may offset each 
other so that an insignificant correlation might wrongly suggest the absence of 
information asymmetry. Because such an equilibrium could be inefficient 
(Finkelstein & McGarry, 2006), it is useful to distinguish these groups in order to 
derive a clearer picture of the different selection effects.  
To test for a heterogeneous sample, we employ an IV method that allows us to 
identify a set of advantageous selectors while disentangling any possible overlap with 
adverse selection. The arrows in Figure 4.3 illustrate the interdependence of insurance 
coverage and risk: (i) designates the potential link resulting from adverse selection, 
(ii) indicates moral hazard, and (iii) represents our assumption that SuppDI 
policyholders differ not only in risk type but also in motivation for purchasing 
SuppDI. From the previous literature, we know that high-risk aversion may lead to 
simultaneous overcautiousness and purchase of health insurance; in other words, 
advantageous selection. In line with Buchmueller et al. (2013), we assume that this 
relation is not restricted to a specific risk and that cautious individuals generally have 
a higher affinity for buying insurance to reduce future risk. We then look at how many 
SuppHIs individuals have in addition to their SuppDI. Based on de Meza and Webb 
(2001), we argue that individuals holding many SuppHIs buy SuppDI because of their 
inner need for security (hereafter, insurance affinity) and are more likely to take 





Figure 4.3: Relation between SuppDI Coverage and Individual Risk of Dental Treatment 
 
As our instrument for having a SuppDI, we use the number of other SuppHIs 
enrolled in. We avoid misspecifying our instrument’s functional form by creating 
the dummy variable “insurance affinity,” which equals 1 if an individual has more 
than two SuppHIs in addition to SuppDI (“high insurance affinity”) and 0 otherwise 
(“low insurance affinity”). In equation (2), we model the linear projection for DIns 
with the same covariates as in model (1) but add in the dichotomous instrument Z, 
which is excluded from the second stage:  
 
P(DIns=1|Z, X, C) = β0 + β 1Z + β 2X + β 3C    (2) 
 
SuppHIs will be a valid instrument (Z) for SuppDI as long as it satisfies two criteria: 
buying other SuppHIs must be a good predictor of purchasing a SuppDI and the 
correlation between dentist visits and having other SuppHIs must not be channeled 
through any other mechanism than that presented here. The first condition is shown 
to be met in our discussion of results; we find the second to be true for the following 
SuppHI components: 
• additional daily hospital benefits; 




• benefits for eyeglasses, drugs, and other medication; 
• long-term care; 
• alternative healing methods and naturopathy; and 
• treatment by a private physician. 
Admittedly, we doubt that worse dental health is likely to influence the decision to 
buy one of these insurance products. Moreover, dental care, being a very distinct 
field, may not be influenced by other health issues that increase the likelihood of 
buying supplemental hospital insurance. Nevertheless, if an individual’s general 
health correlates negatively with overall insurance coverage and positively with 
dental health, any potential bias is likely to be positive.  
This relation, however, is in no way straightforward. Rather, we are interested in 
identifying those who buy SuppDI because of their relatively high insurance affinity, 
a sample we explicitly assume to be heterogeneous in selection behavior. Yet the IV 
results, because they show only a local average selection for a specific subpopulation 
(the effect for so-called compliers), are not representative of the whole sample 
(Imbens & Angrist, 1994). Hence, for the results derived using our instrument, in 
contrast to those based on local average treatment effects, we claim no direct 
causality. Rather, we assert that individuals buying SuppDI because of high insurance 
affinity are better risks because of their preventive behavior, which is not necessarily 
observable.  
4.5 Results 
4.5.1 Evidence for heterogeneous selection 
Table 4.2 shows the effects of the LPM (column 1) representing the aggregated 
correlation between risk and insurance coverage. In this model, the coefficient of 




evidence of information asymmetry. Moreover, although the covariates indicate that 
the dummies for dental implants and prostheses are significant and positive, age 
seems not to affect the number of dentist visits. Nevertheless, individuals reporting 
many preventive dentist visits are more likely to go to the dentist more than twice. 
One obvious explanation is the common practice of arranging further appointments 
if any need for acute treatments is noted during the regular check-up. Fear of the 
dentist, in contrast, seems to have only a minor impact. Estimating the aggregated 
coverage-risk correlation using a probit model (column 5) confirms these results. 
Such a nonsignificant risk-coverage relation in this market may, as already discussed, 
be attributable to one of two possible explanations: (i) the information asymmetry is 
empirically negligible or (ii) the risk- and preference-based selection offset each other 
in the aggregate (Finkelstein & McGarry 2006).50  
We report the results of our tests for this heterogeneous selection in Table 4.2. 
Column 2 shows the results for our 2SLS estimations, while column 3 reports the 
first stage results, whose F-statistic of 220 indicates that the instrument is sufficiently 
strong and Z a good predictor for SuppDI in the model. We also obtain a mildly 
significant negative impact of having a SuppDI policy on dentist visits for acute 
treatments. This negative correlation points to the existence of multidimensional 
private information and advantageous selection within a subgroup of the sample, 
although we again cannot rule out a possible upward bias from moral hazard. The 
reduced form (column 4), which directly estimates the effect of the instrument on the 
dependent variable, also yields significant negative results, suggesting that the 
                                                                
50  Another explanation may be that private health insurers often include an elimination period in 
the SuppDI contracts during which they do not pay for any dental treatment. Unfortunately, the 
Healthcare Monitor does not include information about the date of contract signing. 
Nevertheless, we expect any possible bias to be small because the elimination period is usually 




Interpretation of our IV results in column 2 is valid: those having more than two 
additional health insurances tend to be low risk.51  
Additionally, using an endogeneity test for robust standard errors, we are also able 
to reject the hypothesis that the SuppDI coefficient does not differ from OLS at a 5% 
significance level (Wooldridge, 1995). This rejection supports our assumption that 
the identified sample of advantageous selectors differs significantly from the 
aggregate with respect to risk. It is also worth noting that the 2SLS model (column 
2) explains less variation in the dependent variable because we are now targeting only 
a specific subgroup. The results of the additionally estimated IV probit model 
(column 6) support the findings from the LPM (column 2). 
 
  
                                                                
51  The estimations reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 4.2 are comparable to Finkelstein and 




Table 4.2: Aggregated and Instrumented Selection into Insurance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS 2SLS First stage Reduced 
form 
Probit IV probit 
SuppDI 0.0321 -0.1056*   0.1392 -0.5075* 
  (0.021) (0.059)   (0.089) (0.284) 
Insurance affinity   0.6082*** -0.0642*   
   (0.041) (0.036)   
Underwriting       
Dental prosthetics 0.0746*** 0.0757*** -0.0018 0.0759*** 0.3255*** 0.3165*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.026) (0.021) (0.089) (0.088) 
Dental implants 0.0723** 0.0794** 0.0194 0.0774** 0.2778** 0.3003** 
 (0.035) (0.036) (0.040) (0.035) (0.125) (0.124) 
Age 20-24 0.0224 0.0235 -0.0353 0.0273 0.1139 0.1244 
 (0.051) (0.052) (0.064) (0.051) (0.325) (0.320) 
Age 25-29 0.0454 0.0558 0.0537 0.0502 0.2645 0.3069 
 (0.055) (0.055) (0.067) (0.054) (0.319) (0.311) 
Age 30-34 0.0295 0.0467 0.1105 0.0350 0.1733 0.2481 
 (0.052) (0.054) (0.069) (0.052) (0.307) (0.305) 
Age 35-39 0.0708 0.0885* 0.0944 0.0785 0.3709 0.4427 
 (0.052) (0.053) (0.066) (0.052) (0.295) (0.290) 
Age 40-44 0.0429 0.0623 0.1208* 0.0495 0.2607 0.3446 
 (0.050) (0.052) (0.064) (0.050) (0.290) (0.288) 
Age 45-49 0.0097 0.0283 0.1202* 0.0156 0.1176 0.2002 
 (0.049) (0.051) (0.063) (0.050) (0.293) (0.291) 
Age 50-54 0.0558 0.0708 0.1011 0.0601 0.2918 0.3565 
 (0.052) (0.053) (0.067) (0.052) (0.292) (0.288) 
Age 55-59 0.0552 0.0687 0.0955 0.0586 0.3056 0.3604 
 (0.052) (0.052) (0.064) (0.052) (0.288) (0.284) 
Age 60-64 0.0679 0.0819 0.0996 0.0714 0.3529 0.4085 
 (0.058) (0.059) (0.069) (0.058) (0.304) (0.300) 
Age 65-69 0.0758 0.0878 0.0944 0.0778 0.3783 0.4226 
 (0.054) (0.055) (0.066) (0.054) (0.290) (0.285) 
Age 70-79 0.0524 0.0685 0.1256** 0.0553 0.2888 0.3547 
 (0.049) (0.051) (0.062) (0.049) (0.280) (0.278) 
Preventive visits      
Once in 2 years 0.0709 0.0850 0.1066 0.0738 0.3892 0.4343 
 (0.061) (0.064) (0.071) (0.062) (0.316) (0.315) 
Once a year 0.0103 0.0304 0.1309*** 0.0166 0.0857 0.1705 
 (0.036) (0.037) (0.043) (0.036) (0.221) (0.215) 
Twice a year 0.0839** 0.1123*** 0.1766*** 0.0937** 0.4271** 0.5369** 
 (0.037) (0.039) (0.043) (0.037) (0.217) (0.210) 
3+ a year 0.5942*** 0.6207*** 0.1387** 0.6060*** 1.8687*** 1.9099*** 
 (0.062) (0.063) (0.066) (0.062) (0.260) (0.249) 
Fear of dentist      
Very much -0.0886 -0.0789 0.0760 -0.0869 -0.3322 -0.2733 
 (0.070) (0.070) (0.074) (0.070) (0.290) (0.283) 
Rather more -0.0985 -0.0868 0.0875 -0.0961 -0.4131 -0.3450 
 (0.065) (0.067) (0.073) (0.066) (0.266) (0.262) 
Rather little -0.0911 -0.0850 0.0570 -0.0910 -0.3710 -0.3264 
 (0.065) (0.066) (0.070) (0.065) (0.254) (0.250) 
Very little -0.0247 -0.0040 0.1629** -0.0212 -0.1089 -0.0084 
 (0.068) (0.069) (0.073) (0.068) (0.262) (0.258) 
None  -0.0967 -0.0927 0.0451 -0.0975 -0.3977 -0.3586 
 (0.064) (0.065) (0.069) (0.064) (0.251) (0.245) 
       
Constant 0.0783 0.0707 -0.0564 0.0766 -1.5292*** -1.5022*** 
 (0.075) (0.075) (0.078) (0.075) (0.376) (0.367) 
Observations 1474 1474 1474 1474 1474 1474 
Adj. R² 0.134 0.107 0.100 0.134   
Notes: The dependent variable in column 3 equals 1 for individuals having a SuppDI; otherwise, the dependent variable equals 
1 for individuals who had two or more dentist visits in the previous year. Instrument: more than two additional SuppHI = 1. 
Omitted reference categories: age = age< 20; preventive dentist visits = seldom/only in pain; fear of dentist = panic. Robust 





4.5.2 Robustness Checks 
We test the robustness of our results using additional survey data not observable by 
the insurance company. Table 4.3 reports the share of individuals without any dental 
problems and the self-rated health for four separate subgroups, with the differences 
in means reported within the first and last two columns. The first row shows that the 
share of individuals without SuppDI coverage (12.6%) who are not suffering from 
any dental problems is significantly higher than the respective share of SuppDI 
policyholders (8.9%), indicating that in the aggregate, SuppDI policyholders are 
higher risk than individuals without SuppDI coverage. It should also be noted that 
this result cannot be interpreted as information asymmetry because we do not control 
for insurance company risk classification. It does, however, imply that the negative 
correlation is unlikely to be caused by these companies’ successful engagement in 
active risk selection.52 This minor importance of active risk selection on the part of 
German private health insurers is also supported by the fact that the commissions of 
insurance agents with respect to SuppDI is based on volume rather than profit. Thus, 
these agents are not incentivized to select and reveal information about individual 
risk types to their companies (Cummins & Doherty, 2006). 
Table 4.3: Differences by Insurance and Subgroup 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable No SuppDI SuppDI ≤2 other SuppHIs >2 other SuppHIs 
No dental issues  12.6% 8.9%** 7.2% 18.0%*** 
Self-rated health 3.14 3.13 3,10 3,30* 
Observations 1,067 429 365 64 
Notes:  Measurements: no dental issues (1 = yes); self-related health from bad (1) to excellent (5). The level of significance 
for the statistical differences in means is designated as follows: *p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01.  
 
                                                                
52  Active risk selection means that insurers take measures to attract low-risk individuals and prevent 




Even more relevant, column 4 shows that 18.0% of SuppDI policyholders with 
more than two other SuppHIs have no dental issues versus only 7.2% of SuppDI 
policyholders with fewer additional SuppHIs. This significantly lower result is 
consistent with our earlier estimations showing that multidimensional private 
information leads to preference-based selection by some individuals. It should also 
be noted, however, that the group with more than two other types of insurance does 
not consist only of compliers. Hence, these differences must be interpreted with 
caution. Nevertheless, individuals with high insurance affinity do seem to have better 
dental health, an observation supported by the fact that their mean of self-rated overall 
health is slightly higher than that of the comparison group (for additional intergroup 
differences, see Appendix B Table B 1).  
In general, the differences between these two groups show that SuppDI 
policyholders with a high insurance affinity have a higher income and are better 
educated than SuppDI policyholders with lower insurance affinity. Moreover, as 
shown in Table B1, including variables on smoking behavior, physical activity,53 and 
diet as further proxies for risk preferences suggests that SuppDI policyholders with a 
high insurance affinity are more risk-averse than SuppDI policyholders with a lower 
insurance affinity. On the other hand, those with higher insurance affinity also seem 
to consume more fast food, which is usually a health risk but possibly explainable by 
their younger age. Admittedly, however, the differences between both groups with 
respect to the potential sources of advantageous selection are mostly not statistically 
significant, which is at least partly attributable to the small sample size. 
Table 4.4 reports the regression results for three models containing an increasing 
set of additional covariates. In column 2, the coefficient of the instrumented SuppDI 
                                                                




(-0.1345) becomes slightly more negative than in Table 4.2 (-0.1056) once 
socioeconomic controls are added into the basic model. Whereas the results for most 
of the added covariates in column 2 are insignificant, overall self-assessed health 
shows a significant negative relation to the dependent variable, indicating that 
healthier individuals are generally lower risk with respect to dental treatments. This 
link might contribute to the increased negative coefficient of SuppDI when sick 
individuals purchase more insurance coverage and are a worse dental risk. 
When health is not controlled for, this link affects the second stage error term, 
violating the exclusion restriction and producing an upwardly biased estimate. 
Therefore, even though we cannot directly test for this bias, we split the sample by 
health status and re-estimate the model. The results, shown in Appendix B Table B 2, 
suggest that instrumenting SuppDI does not work when individual health is bad: the 
coefficient shows a positive but insignificant correlation between coverage and risk. 
Moreover, although the SuppDI coefficient is negative and highly significant in the 
upper health distribution (from good to excellent), the impact of self-assessed health 
appears small and the coefficient decouples in the lower health distribution (from bad 
to less good). These findings support the hypothesis that cases of very bad health in 
combination with full insurance coverage can upwardly bias our 2SLS results and 
hamper our identification strategy. Nevertheless, not only are such cases rare, but we 






Table 4.4: Aggregated and Instrumented Selection with Additional Controls 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
SuppDI 0.0264 -0.1345** 0.0275 -0.1172** 0.0252 -0.1171** 
 (0.022) (0.058) (0.022) (0.059) (0.022) (0.057) 
Demographic controls      
Male 0.0088 0.0039 0.0161 0.0114 0.0184 0.0137 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Part time work 0.0495 0.0419 0.0493 0.0414 0.0480 0.0403 
 (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) 
Hourly based 
work 
0.0367 0.0391 0.0159 0.0178 0.0214 0.0239 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
Unemployed -0.0303 -0.0247 -0.0343 -0.0291 -0.0337 -0.0286 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
Trainee position -0.0013 -0.0038 0.0009 -0.0029 0.0066 0.0026 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.054) (0.053) (0.055) (0.054) 
A-level  0.0068 0.0003 0.0058 0.0015 0.0037 -0.0003 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Married 0.0176 0.0317 0.0163 0.0285 0.0169 0.0283 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) 
Widowed 0.0668 0.0835 0.0615 0.0783 0.0735 0.0898 
 (0.054) (0.056) (0.055) (0.056) (0.054) (0.055) 
Divorced -0.0065 0.0100 -0.0098 0.0045 -0.0053 0.0085 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
Income 0.0151 0.0262** 0.0140 0.0234** 0.0147 0.0239** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) 
HH size -0.0143 -0.0193* -0.0126 -0.0164 -0.0121 -0.0156 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Self-rated health -0.0341** -0.0349** -0.0379** -0.0384*** -0.0301** -0.0306** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Risk measures       
Care about health   -0.0073 -0.0095 -0.0079 -0.0099 
   (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Never smoker   -0.0021 -0.0063 -0.0005 -0.0040 
   (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
BMI   -0.0040* -0.0039* -0.0043** -0.0041* 
   (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Physical activity   -0.0117* -0.0112* -0.0121* -0.0116* 
   (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Consumption       
Fruits   0.0040 0.0035 0.0055 0.0052 
   (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Vegetables   0.0104 0.0132 0.0089 0.0113 
   (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Fast food   -0.0111 -0.0099 -0.0142 -0.0123 
   (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) 
Sweets   0.0158 0.0161 0.0099 0.0095 
   (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Dental issues       
Periodontitis     0.0784*** 0.0706** 
     (0.029) (0.029) 
Filling     0.0318 0.0381* 
     (0.022) (0.022) 
Braces     -0.0196 -0.0260 
     (0.056) (0.057) 
Grind teeth     0.0561 0.0625 
     (0.040) (0.040) 
Missing teeth     0.0334 0.0373 
     (0.036) (0.036) 
Toothache     0.1406 0.1707* 
     (0.094) (0.094) 
Chewing/jaw      0.1357* 0.1356* 
     (0.080) (0.075) 





Table 4.4 (continued) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
Caries     0.0467 0.0429 
     (0.043) (0.043) 
       
Constant 0.2057** 0.1967** 0.3121** 0.3004** 0.2724** 0.2565* 
 (0.097) (0.097) (0.137) (0.137) (0.139) (0.138) 
Fear dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Underwriting  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Preventive visits Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1448 1448 1382 1382 1382 1382 
Adj. R² 0.136 0.100 0.141 0.111 0.157 0.128 
Notes : The dependent variable equals 1 for individuals who had two or more dentist visits in the previous year. Income is 
measured in €1,000 intervals from < € 1,000 up to > €5,000 monthly net household income. Self-rated health: bad=1 to 
excellent=5. Care about health: not at all = 1 to very strongly = 5. Activity: never = 1 to daily = 6. Diet:  never/seldom = 1 
to daily = 4. Omitted reference categories: full time employment, marital status = single. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. 
 
In columns 3 and 4 of Table 4.4, we include additional proxies for possible risk 
tolerance, including BMI, physical activity, and diet. The observed decrease in 
magnitude of the SuppDI coefficient suggests that we are capturing some of the 
linkage between insurance affinity and risk. Adding further information about current 
dental health into columns 5 and 6 slightly reduces the coefficient size; however, in 
column 5, the coefficient remains positive and insignificant, while in column 6 (the 
2SLS results), the correlation remains significantly negative. 
4.6 Conclusions 
In this paper, we analyze information asymmetry in the German SuppDI market using 
a representative sample from the Healthcare Monitor patient survey. Our results 
provide no evidence that individuals with SuppDI visit the dentist for acute treatments 
more frequently than individuals without SuppDI, meaning that like many other 
recent studies on SuppHI in other countries, we find no support in the aggregate for 
the positive coverage-risk correlation predicted by classic adverse selection models. 
Although this lack of evidence could be attributed to information asymmetry not 
being empirically important in this market, we suggest it could be better explained by 




method to disentangle any overlap between adverse and advantageous selection. 
Using possession of a SuppHI in addition to a SuppDI as our instrument, we show 
that SuppDI policyholders with a high insurance affinity go to the dentist for acute 
treatments significantly less frequently than those without SuppDI coverage, which 
supports the multiple information offset assumption. These results remain robust even 
after we control for a comprehensive set of covariates, which suggests that 
demographic characteristics alone, even when used for a more thorough 
underwriting, are insufficient to account for such selection behavior.  
Nevertheless, even though these results are consistent with our findings that 
SuppDI policyholders with a high insurance affinity have better dental health than 
other SuppDI policyholders, we are unable to fully identify the causal mechanics by 
controlling for further covariates. That is, because the survey items gather only 
dichotomous information on dental health (e.g. “Do you have a least one dental 
filling?”), we cannot control for the intensive margin of dental health (i.e., whether 
an individual has 1 or 10 dental fillings), which might explain the remaining 
information asymmetry in our model and provide a possible cause for the remaining 
lower dental risk of the instrumented SuppDI policyholders.  
Our findings do, however, provide solid evidence of information asymmetry in 
the German SuppDI market, an imbalance disguised by heterogeneous selection 
behavior. We thus argue that more than one type of individual is buying insurance 
coverage: on the one hand, individuals with private information about their own high 
risk lead to adverse selection; on the other, low risk individuals who purchase because 
of higher risk aversion lead to advantageous selection. Although these different 
selection effects can offset each other in the aggregate, they lead to a market 




symmetric information (de Meza & Webb, 2001; Finkelstein & McGarry, 2006). 
Further research is thus needed that extends our insights about heterogeneous 
selection and tests our findings using longitudinal data with better risk measures. 
Such investigation might reveal the causal channels for the negative coverage-risk 
correlation and yield robust results for practical application. 
In the meantime, the selection effects identified here might be gainfully used by 
the German SuppDI market for a more thorough underwriting, which could decrease 
inefficiencies from information asymmetry. In particular, given the lack of perfect 
competition between insurance companies, private health insurers in the German 
SuppDI market might profit not only from more thorough premium differentiation 
but from selecting individuals with a high insurance affinity.54 
  
                                                                
54  Under the opposite assumption of perfect competition in the insurance market (cf. the model 




5 General Conclusions 
This thesis contains three academic articles that differ in scope and methodology, but 
jointly contribute to improve the understanding of population aging and particularly 
elderly care. The first paper reviews the large body of literature on the effects of 
caregiving on the caregiver’s life domains, namely: employment, health, and family. 
Even though the relationship with employment has become a great focus in recent 
years, the empirical findings are far from conclusive. This can be partly related to 
methodological difficulties to convincingly estimate a causal relationship of 
caregiving on employment. However, researchers have found a mostly negative but 
relatively small correlation in most population based samples – if even significant on 
a statistically level. Concerning health, the results are less equivocal. Despite the fact 
that most contributions are from non-economic fields, the association between 
caregiving and health is found to be generally negative. However, a small stream of 
literature also highlights possible channels for positive outcomes of caregiving: care 
duty can lead to strengthened familial relationships and psychological rewards from 
feelings of mastery or achievement. Implications on the family arrangements are less 
studied, where the relationship can have two pathways: first, married caregivers can 
often rely on support of their partner and face less financial burden. Second, care 
situations are associated with lower marital satisfaction and tend to strengthen 
traditional gender roles. Generally, it can be concluded that the implications of 
caregiving are complex and interdependent, which makes an overall valuation 
difficult. However, more research is needed to draw a clearer picture of the effects of 





The second paper is an empirical analysis and focuses on the effects of caregiving 
on the caregiver’s well-being. As already mentioned in the literature review, 
population-based evidence for psychological stress of caregiving is scarce and this 
study is, to the candidate’s best knowledge, the first to assess the effects of caregiving 
on subjective well-being in Germany. Additionally, the use of panel data allows to 
account for unobserved heterogeneity in the data, getting close to a causal 
interpretation of the results. The estimates from the German Socio-Economic Panel 
suggest a mainly negative link between caregiving and subjective well-being. This 
appears to be true for higher intensity with diminishing marginal burden for 
extremely long care hours. For the care duration, the results support neither of the 
classical theories – i.e., adaption or wear-and-tear. In fact, results suggest care burden 
to be U-shaped with the years of caregiving, meaning that in the first years the 
caregiving burden becomes more sever before a process of adaption sets in. Splitting 
the regressions by birth years shows that older generations are particularly burdened, 
as no significant link could be obtained for caregivers born after the 1950s. However, 
a more detailed analysis of the family structure finds the coefficients for 
intergenerational caregivers (e.g., parental care) to indicate a higher burden per hour, 
if compared to intragenerational caregivers (e.g., spousal care). An economic 
valuation of caregiving burden yields the opportunity cost of one hour of caregiving 
to be around seven Euros. As the estimations are based on data from 2001 to 2010, 
the valuation yields hourly costs close to the minimum wage in the formal care sector 
at that time.  
Public policies were designed as reaction to demographic change and, thereby, 
try to address the downturns associated with informal caregiving. Financial support 




recipient in need creates a substantial risk to the family, as loss of income and formal 
care costs may overburden the family’s budget. Even though Germany had 
implemented a compulsory long-term care insurance in 1994, a financial risk remains 
existent due to the design of the system. To reduce the remaining financial risk caused 
by the capped benefits, private companies offer additional coverage through 
supplemental health insurances. Even though shifting health care coverage to the 
private sector may reduce the financial pressure on the public budget, such solutions 
create an additional risk of market inefficiency that do not provide an optimal 
equilibrium.  
Therefore, the third paper analyzes a market for supplemental health insurance 
and yields new insights on selection behavior. As data on long-term care insurance 
was unavailable, the empirical analysis is based on data from the market for 
supplemental dental insurance. However, both markets are characterized by great 
similarities – i.e., the scarce underwriting and the coverage of out-of-pocket expenses 
– making the results likely to be transferable. By using an innovative instrumental 
variables approach, the paper reveals selection behavior in heterogeneous group of 
people. The empirical approach isolates a subset of highly insurance-affine people 
that buy insurance coverage because of their inner need for security; results show that 
such individuals lead to a negative coverage-risk correlation. This advantageous 
selection is, however, not evident when measuring the overall link between coverage 
and risk as it is counterbalanced by other dynamics - i.e. advers selection or moral 
hazard. These results raise the concern of an inefficient market solution for private 
supplemental health insurances and underline the risks of increasing individual 
responsibility by shifting more and more health care coverage to the private sector.  




supplemental dental insurance, but also introduces a new method that allows to test 
for market asymmetries and selection behavior within a heterogeneous sample. 
To sum up, population aging is a great challenge and the growing demand for 
caregiving requires an efficient use of the limited resources available. Even though 
the well-being of the elderly should be a primary objective for policy makers, it would 
be shortsighted not to also consider possible outcomes for the informal caregivers. 
This thesis highlights some important aspects, which may help to design more holistic 
policies that account for all stakeholders involved and, thereby, improve the way a 
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Table A 1: Descriptive statistics - Model I 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Subjective well-being 6.97119 1.768399 0 10 
Care time weekly 1.11235 6.919154 0 168 
Years of caring .2107114 .9249506 0 10 
CR in the HH .0249679 .1560277 0 1 
Age 48.07661 17.51999 16 100 
Male .4794583 .4995792 0 1 
Health status 3.378018 .9573898 1 5 
Net household income 2991.553 2126.816 0 99999 
High education .3824814 .4859945 0 1 
Married & together .6045294 .4889528 0 1 
Married & separated .0171154 .1297019 0 1 
Divorced .0716932 .25798 0 1 
Widowed  .0657355 .2478198 0 1 
Fully employed .3899549 .4877411 0 1 
Part-time employed .1041031 .305395 0 1 
Otherwise employed  .1230816 .3285317 0 1 












Variable Cohort Mean Standard  
Deviation 
Min Max 
Subjective well-being 00s 5.625 236 0 10 
10s 6.321 224 0 10 
20’s 6.857 1.934 0 10 
30s 6.946 1.803 0 10 
40s 6.978 1.788 0 10 
50s 6.777 1.832 0 10 
60s 6.932 1.731 0 10 
70s 7.097 1.649 0 10 
80s 7.271 1.628 0 10 
90s 7.521 1.581 1 10 
Regular care time weekly  
by caregivers 
00s 30 . 30 30 
10s 19.85 15.21 1 70 
20s 20.82 22.35 1 168 
30s 18.24 23.38 1 168 
40s 14.53 20.17 1 168 
50s 11.91 16.03 1 168 
60s 14.70 24.15 1 168 
70s 14.23 24.60 1 168 
80s 1.26 16.96 1 168 
90s 9.38 10.16 1 56 
Share of caregivers in the sample 
00s .0113 .1066 0 1 
10s .0579 .2337 0 1 
20s .0804 .2720 0 1 
30s .0993 .2991 0 1 
40s .1163 .3205 0 1 
50s .1086 .3112 0 1 
60s .0562 .230a 0 1 
70s .0336 .1802 0 1 
80s .0298 .1701 0 1 
90s .0310 .1736 0 1 
Share of male caregivers 
00s . 0 0  
10s .5057 .5028 0 1 
20s .5452 .4982 0 1 
30s .4413 .4966 0 1 
40s .4070 .4913 0 1 
50s .3363 .4725 0 1 
60s .3116 .4632 0 1 
70s .3129 .4639 0 1 
80s .4767 .4998 0 1 




Table A 3: Descriptive statistics – Model III 
Variable Mean  
Standard  
Deviation Min  Max  
Caregiver with care receiver in the household .0197 .1391 0 1 
Noncaregiver with  care receiver in the household .0052 .0720 0 1 
Caregiver with no care receiver in the household .0557 .2295 0 1 
Other  variables similar to descriptive statistics of Model I 
 
 
Table A 4: Descriptive statistics – Model IV:  Intergenerational care 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Subjective well-being 6.7023 1.9520 0 10 
Care time weekly 17.0984 20.5277 1 168 
Years of caring 3.1612 2.2352 1 10 
Age 50.9876 13.7514 17 85 
Male .4488 .4975 0 1 
Health status 3.2527 .9727 1 5 
Net household income 3261.509 1799.145 345 12000 
High education .4441 .4970 0 1 
Married & together .6279 .4835 0 1 
Married & separated .0155 .1235 0 1 
Divorced .0542 .2266 0 1 
Widowed  .0348 .1835 0 1 
Fully employed .3155 .4648 0 1 
Part-time employed .1201 .3252 0 1 
Otherwise employed .1356 .3425 0 1 
Child below 16 in  HH .1100 .3131 0 1 






Table A 5: Descriptive statistics – Model IV:  Intragenerational care 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Subjective well-being 6.0844 2.0159 0 10 
Care time weekly 25.0482 28.3214 1 168 
Years of caring 3.0694 2.1837 1 10 
Age 66.1464 13.2283 17 99 
Male .4563 .4981 0 1 
Health status 2.8103 .9645 1 5 
Net household income 2321.903 1252.448 329 12000 
High education .5640 .4959 0 1 
Married & together .8369 .3694 0 1 
Married & separated .0108 .1034 0 1 
Divorced .0428 .2025 0 1 
Widowed  .0669 .2500 0 1 
Fully employed .1085 .3111 0 1 
Part-time employed .0482 .2143 0 1 
Otherwise employed .1064 .3085 0 1 
Child below 16 in  HH .0470 .2116 0 1 
Observations 2404    
 
Table A 6: Descriptive statistics – Model V 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Subjective well-being 6.6831 1.8595 0 10 
Care time weekly 14.7262 20.8170 1 168 
Years of caring 2.7895 2.0328 1 10 
CR in the HH .2614 .4394 0 1 
Age 54.3340 14.7092 17 99 
Male .3854 .4867 0 1 
Health status 3.177 .9290 1 5 
Net household income 2996.876 2015.153 0 55000 
High education .4027 .4904 0 1 
Married & together .7374 .4400 0 1 
Married & separated .0142 .1183 0 1 
Divorced .0683 .2523 0 1 
Widowed  .0569 .2317 0 1 
Fully employed .2950 .4560 0 1 
Part-time employed .1319 .3384 0 1 
Otherwise employed  .1208 .3260 0 1 
Child below 16 in  HH .1891 .3916 0 1 








Table B 1: SuppDI Policyholders: Low versus High Insurance Affinity 
  
 Low insurance 
affinity 
 
High insurance  
affinity 
 
Characteristics  (1) (2) 
Male 0,435 0,393 
Age 51,418 44,098*** 
Married 0,648 0,574 
Income 2,960 3,180 
A-level 0,438 0,492 
Employment   
    Full time 0,392 0,492 
    Part time 0,121 0,082 
    Hourly 0,066 0,033 
    Unemployed 0,378 0,344 
    Job training 0,043 0,049 
Household size 2,346 2,311 
Self-rated health 3,101 3,295* 
Never smoker 0,524 0,574 
BMI 26,427 27,202 
Activity 3,983 4,328 
Diet   
    Fruits 3,271 3,246 
    Vegetables 3,135 3,148 
    Fast food 1,801 1,951* 
    Sweets 2,415 2,443 
Dentist visits per year 2,081 1,869 
Number of other SuppHIs 0.726 3.754*** 
Usual preventive dentist visits per year  
    Seldom/only in pain 0,023 0,016 
    Once in 2 years 0,023 0,000 
    Once  0,363 0,295 
    Twice  0,539 0,623 
    Three times or more 0,052 0,066 
Dental issues   
    Periodontitis 0,167 0,115 
    Filling 0,720 0,770 
    Prosthesis 0,441 0,443 
    Implant  0,124 0,148 
    Braces 0,017 0,016 
    Grind teeth 0,075 0,082 
    Missing teeth 0,098 0,098 
    Toothache 0,023 0,033 
    Chewing/jaw 0,026 0,016 
    Caries 0,061 0,066 
    No issues 0,072 0,180*** 
Observations 365 64 
Notes: Sample size can slightly vary within each variable. Income is measured in €1,000 intervals from < €1,000 up to > 
€5,000 monthly net household income. Self-rated health: bad = 1 to excellent = 5. Activity: never = 1 to daily = 6. Diet: 
never/seldom = 1 to daily = 4.  The level of significance for the statistical differences in a two-sided t-test between the two 




Table B 2: Individual Health Status: Good versus Bad 
 Good Health Bad Health 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
SuppDI 0.0263 -0.1567*** 0.0009 0.2482 
 (0.024) (0.057) (0.055) (0.375) 
Self-rated health -0.0307* -0.0325* -0.3764*** -0.3545*** 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.107) (0.107) 
Constant 0.2650** 0.2570** 0.5161* 0.3381 
 (0.119) (0.119) (0.262) (0.376) 
Fear dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Underwriting  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Demographic controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1,166 1,166 282 282 
Adj. R² 0.109 0.059 0.254 0.185 
Notes: The dependent variable equals 1 for individuals who had two or more dentist visits in the previous year. Good health 
includes good, very good, and excellent health; bad health includes less good and bad health. The variable self-rated health 
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